CVE-2025-59695
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedEntrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7, allow a user with OS root access to alter firmware on the Chassis Management Board (without Authentication). This is called F04.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA vulnerability in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi allows authenticated users with OS root-level access to modify firmware on the Chassis Management Board without any authentication, enabling potential persistent compromise of the hardware security module.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 13.6.12>= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0< 13.6.12>= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0< 13.6.12>= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0< 13.6.12>= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0< 13.6.12>= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify HSM model and firmware versionAccess the HSM management interface or use the vendor-provided CLI tool (typically 'fwverify' or via the nShield management utilities) to retrieve the current firmware version installed on the deviceAffected if The firmware version is either below 13.6.12, or falls within the range 13.7.3 to 13.9.0 (exclusive of 13.9.0)
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Determine if OS root-level access is possibleReview user access controls and audit logs to determine whether any user account has root-level operating system access on the HSM, including any service accounts or administrative interfaces that provide OS-level privilegesAffected if Any authenticated user possesses root-level OS access to the HSM device
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Verify Chassis Management Board configurationExamine the HSM configuration for the Chassis Management Board settings, typically accessible via the HSM's web management interface or serial console, to confirm whether firmware modification operations are logged or restrictedAffected if The Chassis Management Board allows firmware modifications without requiring additional authentication beyond OS root access
Your environment is affected if the installed firmware version matches the vulnerable ranges (< 13.6.12 or >= 13.7.3 to < 13.9.0) AND any user has root-level OS access to the HSM device.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped13.6.1213.9.0
Restrict physical and logical access to HSM devices to trusted personnel only, and apply vendor-provided firmware updates beyond versions 13.6.11/13.7 which address this authentication bypass in the Chassis Management Board.
Upgrade to firmware >= 13.6.12 (for versions < 13.6.12) or >= 13.9.0 (for versions >= 13.7.3)
- 1. Identify the current firmware version of the affected nShield device (5c, HSMi, or Connect XC)
- 2. Determine which firmware branch is currently installed (< 13.6.12 or >= 13.7.3, < 13.9.0)
- 3. For devices on firmware < 13.6.12: Upgrade to firmware version 13.6.12 or later
- 4. For devices on firmware >= 13.7.3 and < 13.9.0: Upgrade to firmware version 13.9.0 or later
- 5. Obtain the firmware update from Entrust's official support portal or authorized distribution channels
- 6. Follow Entrust's standard firmware upgrade procedure, ensuring proper power supply and backup of configuration
- 7. After upgrade, verify the firmware version and confirm the vulnerability is remediated
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-59695 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-59695 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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