CVE-2025-59733
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedWhen decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset. The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels. If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHeap-based buffer overflow in OpenEXR's DWAA/DWAB decompression. The decoder incorrectly assumes all channels share the same pixel type/size as the main color channels, and that 4 channels map to BGRA. When channels of different sizes (e.g., 2-byte EXR_HALF) are added alongside 4-byte main channels, pointer arithmetic at [7] uses 4-byte increments, causing the write to exceed the buffer allocated based on mixed channel sizes.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- P
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check OpenEXR library versionRun 'openexr-config --version' or examine the installed libOpenEXR library file (e.g., 'ls -la /usr/lib/libOpenEXR*') to identify the version numberAffected if The installed version is earlier than 8.0.0 (versions prior to 8.0 lack the heterogeneous channel type handling fix)
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Identify if DWAA or DWAB compression is usedInspect the OpenEXR file header using 'exrheader <file.exr>' or a similar tool; look for the 'compression' field in the outputAffected if The 'compression' field shows 'DWAA' or 'DWAB' (the vulnerability only affects these compression types)
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Check for heterogeneous channel types in the fileUsing 'exrheader <file.exr>', examine the channel definitions (e.g., 'channel R', 'channel G', 'channel B', 'channel A') and their pixel types (HALF, FLOAT, UINT)Affected if The file contains channels of different pixel types/sizes (e.g., some channels are HALF while others are FLOAT, or channels of differing byte sizes coexist); this mixed sizing triggers the faulty pointer arithmetic
A user is affected if they use OpenEXR versions prior to 8.0 to decompress files using DWAA or DWAB compression that contain channels with heterogeneous pixel type sizes.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade OpenEXR to version 8.0 or later, which includes proper handling of heterogeneous channel types in DWAA/DWAB decompression.
OpenEXR version 8.0 or later
- Identify the current version of OpenEXR installed in your project by checking your dependency manifest or by running a package manager query (e.g., `pip show openexr`, `conan search`, or checking `package.json`/`Cargo.toml` depending on your build system)
- Locate the build system or dependency management file where OpenEXR is declared (e.g., `CMakeLists.txt`, `conanfile.txt`, `package-lock.json`, `requirements.txt`)
- Update the OpenEXR dependency requirement to version 8.0 or higher. For example, in a CMake find_package statement, change the version requirement; in Python, use `pip install openexr>=8.0`; in Conan, update the version constraint
- Run your dependency update process (e.g., `conan install`, `pip install -r requirements.txt`, or rebuild the project)
- Verify the new version is installed correctly by checking the library version at runtime or rebuilding and confirming no version-related errors
- Rebuild and test your application to ensure the OpenEXR decoding functionality works correctly with the new version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-59733 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-59733 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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