CVE-2025-60856
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedReolink Video Doorbell WiFi DB_566128M5MP_W allows root shell access through an unsecured UART/serial console. An attacker with physical access can connect to the exposed interface and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because of "certain restrictions on users privately connecting serial port cables" and because "the root user has a password and it meets the requirements of password security complexity."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Reolink Video Doorbell WiFi DB_566128M5MP_W contains an exposed UART/serial console interface that provides direct root shell access without authentication. An attacker with physical access can connect to these debug pins and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, achieving full device compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Physical
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the device label on the Reolink doorbell or check the product packaging, management interface, or FCC ID label. The model number should be DB_566128M5MP_W or similar variant.Affected if The device model matches DB_566128M5MP_W or its variants (Reolink Video Doorbell WiFi)
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Physically inspect for exposed debug headersOpen the device casing and examine the PCB for a 3-4 pin header (often labeled TX, RX, GND, VCC or debug/CONSOLE). Use a magnifying glass if needed. The pins are typically located near the edge of the circuit board.Affected if Exposed UART/serial debug header pins are present on the PCB and accessible after removing the housing
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Test serial console authenticationConnect a USB-to-serial adapter (ground to GND, TX to RX, RX to TX) to the debug pins. Use terminal software (baud rate 115200, 8N1) and observe the boot output and login prompt. Try pressing Enter to see if a shell appears.Affected if The serial console provides a root shell or login prompt that grants root access without requiring any password
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Analyze firmware for insecure serial configIf you have access to the firmware binary, extract and examine /etc/inittab, /etc/securetty, or the getty configuration. Look for lines enabling serial getty on ttyS0 or ttyAMA0 without root password enforcement.Affected if The firmware configures serial console (ttyS0/ttyAMA0) to allow root login without authentication or leaves it enabled without password protection
You are affected if you possess a Reolink Video Doorbell WiFi DB_566128M5MP_W device with exposed UART debug pins that grant root shell access without authentication when connected.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable or password-protect the serial console in firmware, implement secure boot to prevent unauthorized firmware modification, and physically protect or remove exposed debug headers. Restrict physical access to the device.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $14,080.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-60856 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-60856 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data