CVE-2025-61543
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA Host Header Injection vulnerability exists in the password reset functionality of CraftMyCMS 4.0.2.2. The system uses `$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']` directly to construct password reset links sent via email. An attacker can manipulate the Host header to send malicious reset links, enabling phishing attacks or account takeover.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCraftMyCMS 4.0.2.2 uses the client-supplied HTTP Host header (`$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']`) directly in password reset URL generation, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary domains into reset links sent via email. This Host Header Injection enables phishing attacks and potential account takeover by tricking users into clicking attacker-controlled URLs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify CraftMyCMS versionCheck the installed version by looking for a version.php, version.txt, or similar file in the CMS root directory, or inspect any admin panel about page. Common locations include /version.php, /includes/version.php, or the admin dashboard.Affected if The installed version is CraftMyCMS 4.0.2.2 or any version that includes the password reset functionality with direct HTTP_HOST usage.
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Locate the password reset scriptSearch the web root for PHP files related to password reset functionality. Look for filenames containing 'reset', 'password', or 'forgot' - such as reset-password.php, password-reset.php, or forgot-password.php in the /admin, /user, or root directories.Affected if A password reset script exists and is accessible on the web server.
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Find direct HTTP_HOST usage in reset codeOpen the identified password reset PHP file and search for 'HTTP_HOST' within the code. Look for patterns like $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] being used to construct URLs, particularly for generating email reset links.Affected if The code contains $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] used directly in URL construction for password reset emails without validation against an allowlist.
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Verify Host header injection is possibleIf you have access to test the password reset flow, send a request to the password reset page with a manipulated Host header (e.g., Host: attacker.com) and check if the resulting reset URL contains the injected domain in the email or response.Affected if The password reset URL in the email response or generated link reflects the client-supplied Host header without server-side validation.
A user is affected if they are running CraftMyCMS 4.0.2.2 with the vulnerable password reset code that directly uses the HTTP Host header to construct reset URLs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace direct usage of `$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']` with a trusted, server-defined hostname from configuration or environment variables, with validation against an allowlist if dynamic handling is required.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-61543 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-61543 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data