CVE-2025-61775
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedVickey is a Misskey-based microblogging platform. A vulnerability exists in Vickey prior to version 2025.10.0 where unexpired email confirmation links can be reused multiple times to send repeated confirmation emails to a verified email address. Under certain conditions, a verified email address could receive repeated confirmation messages if the verification link was accessed multiple times. This issue may result in unintended email traffic but does not expose user data. The issue was addressed in version 2025.10.0 by improving validation logic to ensure verification links behave as expected after completion.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceVickey prior to version 2025.10.0 contains a logic flaw in its email verification mechanism where unexpired confirmation links can be reused multiple times after initial verification. This causes the system to resend confirmation emails to already-verified addresses each time the link is accessed, creating unintended email traffic.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Vickey versionRun `vickey --version` or check the installed package version via your package manager (e.g., `pip show vickey`, `npm list vickey`, or similar depending on your installation method)Affected if The installed version is earlier than 2025.10.0 (e.g., 2025.9.x, 2025.8.x, etc.)
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Confirm email verification feature is activeInspect your Vickey configuration file (commonly `config.py`, `settings.py`, or a YAML/JSON config file in the application root or `/etc/vickey/`) and verify that email verification or account confirmation is enabled (look for flags such as `ENABLE_EMAIL_VERIFY`, `REQUIRE_EMAIL_CONFIRMATION`, or similar)Affected if Email verification is enabled and the version is before 2025.10.0
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Review access logs for repeated verification link usageExamine application logs, access logs, or email sending logs for duplicate requests using the same confirmation token. Search for repeated POST/GET requests to the verification endpoint (often `/verify`, `/confirm`, or `/email/verify`) with identical token parameters within a short timeframeAffected if Multiple requests with the same verification token are logged and each triggers an email send
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Check database or token store for reuse behaviorQuery the database or token storage (if accessible) for confirmation tokens. Determine whether tokens remain marked as 'valid' or 'unused' after the initial verification is completed. Inspect whether the system checks token status before resending emailsAffected if Verification tokens are not invalidated or marked as used after first successful confirmation, allowing reuse
You are affected if Vickey version is before 2025.10.0, email verification is enabled, and confirmation links can be reused to trigger duplicate emails.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Vickey to version 2025.10.0 or later which implements improved validation logic to prevent reuse of verification links after completion.
2025.10.0
- Backup your current Vickey installation and database before proceeding
- Update Vickey to version 2025.10.0 using your deployment method (e.g., package manager, git pull, Docker)
- Verify the upgrade completed successfully by checking the application version
- Test the email verification flow to confirm the fix is working (submit confirmation link multiple times - it should now only work once)
- Monitor email logs to confirm no unexpected confirmation emails are being sent
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,272.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-61775 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-61775 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data