RackApplication

CVE-2025-61780

MEDIUM · 5.3 CVSS v3.1 Published 2025-10-10
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 2.2.20 / 3.1.18 or later.
See remediation →
62/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click Patch available

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to versions 2.2.20, 3.1.18, and 3.2.3, a possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in `Rack::Sendfile` when running behind a proxy that supports `x-sendfile` headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause `Rack::Sendfile` to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions. When `Rack::Sendfile` received untrusted `x-sendfile-type` or `x-accel-mapping` headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a "redirect" response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was not subject to the proxy's access controls. An attacker could exploit this by setting a crafted `x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirect` header, setting a crafted `x-accel-mapping` header, and requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration. Attackers could bypass proxy-enforced restrictions and access internal endpoints intended to be protected (such as administrative pages). The vulnerability did not allow arbitrary file reads but could expose sensitive application routes. This issue only affected systems meeting all of the following conditions: The application used `Rack::Sendfile` with a proxy that supports `x-accel-redirect` (e.g., Nginx); the proxy did **not** always set or remove the `x-sendfile-type` and `x-accel-mapping` headers; and the application exposed an endpoint that returned a body responding to `.to_path`. Users should upgrade to Rack versions 2.2.20, 3.1.18, or 3.2.3, which require explicit configuration to enable `x-accel-redirect`. Alternatively, configure the proxy to always set or strip the header, or in Rails applications, disable sendfile completely.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis
How this class of weakness works · CWE-200

The application discloses data — error detail, internal paths, tokens, or other users' records — to someone who shouldn't see it. On its own it can look minor, but it hands attackers the map they need for a larger attack. Remediation is about minimising what's returned and enforcing authorization on every piece of data.

General guidance for the information exposure class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
RackApplication
Affected:< 2.2.20>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.18>= 3.2.0, < 3.2.3

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 2.2.20 / 3.1.18 / 3.2.3 or later
Fixed in 2.2.203.1.183.2.3
Vendor patch github.com →
Recommended fix High confidence

Rack 2.2.20, 3.1.18, or 3.2.3 depending on your major version branch

  1. Determine your current Rack version by running `gem list rack` or checking your Gemfile.lock
  2. Identify which major version line you're on (Rack 2.x, 3.0.x-3.1.x, or 3.2.x)
  3. For Rack 2.x users: run `bundle update rack` to upgrade to version 2.2.20
  4. For Rack 3.0.x-3.1.x users: run `bundle update rack` to upgrade to version 3.1.18
  5. For Rack 3.2.x users: run `bundle update rack` to upgrade to version 3.2.3
  6. After upgrading, verify the new version is installed: `gem list rack`
  7. If your application uses x-accel-redirect functionality, you must now explicitly enable it in your Rack configuration (the fix requires explicit opt-in configuration)
  8. Test that sendfile functionality works correctly with your proxy configuration
Caveat The fix requires explicit configuration to enable x-accel-redirect; applications previously relying on implicit behavior will need to be updated to explicitly configure the feature

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-61780 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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