CVE-2025-62348
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSalt's junos execution module contained an unsafe YAML decode/load usage. A specially crafted YAML payload processed by the junos module could lead to unintended code execution under the context of the Salt process.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe Salt junos execution module uses unsafe YAML loading (yaml.load instead of yaml.safe_load), allowing specially crafted YAML payloads to execute arbitrary code within the Salt process context.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Locate the Salt junos execution moduleFind the junos.py file in your Salt installation, typically under salt/modules/junos.py or in the file system where Salt modules are stored. Run: find / -path '*/salt/modules/junos.py' 2>/dev/nullAffected if The file exists and is present in the Salt installation
-
Inspect YAML loading calls in the junos moduleOpen the junos.py file and search for patterns like 'yaml.load(' without 'safe' in the function name. Use grep: grep -n 'yaml.load' /path/to/junos.pyAffected if The code contains yaml.load() calls that do not use yaml.safe_load() or yaml.safe_load() variant
-
Verify if the module is enabled in SaltCheck Salt's module configuration: run 'salt '*' cmd.run "ls /var/cache/salt/master/extmods/modules/"' or check if junos is listed in 'salt '*' cmd.run "python3 -c 'import salt.modules.junos"'"Affected if The junos module is loaded or loadable in the Salt minion or master
-
Check for junos device configurationReview /etc/salt/proxy or pillar data for junos proxy minions: look for 'junos' in proxy configuration files or pillar top files that reference junosAffected if Junos proxy minions or pillar configurations exist that would invoke the junos module
-
Confirm YAML input reaches the junos moduleAudit any custom sls files, pillars, or external inputs that feed YAML to Salt and could route through the junos module execution pathAffected if Custom YAML content is processed by Salt and could reach the vulnerable yaml.load() call
You are affected if the junos.py module exists in your Salt installation and contains unsafe yaml.load() calls that process untrusted YAML input.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace unsafe yaml.load() calls with yaml.safe_load() in the junos module and validate all YAML input before processing.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-62348 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-62348 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data