CVE-2025-7623
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack-based buffer overflow in the SMASH-CLP shell. An authenticated attacker with SSH access to the BMC can exploit a stack buffer overflow via a crafted SMASH command, overwrite the return address and registers, and achieve arbitrary code execution on the BMC firmware operating system
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in the SMASH-CLP shell allows an authenticated attacker with SSH access to the BMC to send a crafted SMASH command that overflows a stack buffer, overwrites return addresses and registers, and achieves arbitrary code execution on the BMC firmware operating system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify SSH access is enabled on the BMCLog into the BMC web interface or use IPMI/Redfish to check the SSH service status. From the BMC CLI, run: `ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> raw` or check via Redfish endpoint /Managers/1/NetworkProtocol. Alternatively, attempt an SSH connection to the BMC IP on port 22.Affected if SSH is enabled and accepts authentication - this is the required attack vector for exploiting this vulnerability
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Confirm SMASH-CLP service is exposedCheck if the SMASH-CLP shell is accessible. This is typically accessed via SSH by invoking a SMASH session after authentication, or via IPMI raw commands. Use: `ssh admin@<BMC_IP>` then run SMASH-CLP commands, or use IPMI raw command to test SMASH availability.Affected if SMASH-CLP shell is accessible through the SSH session - this is the vulnerable component
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Check BMC firmware versionRetrieve the BMC firmware version via IPMI: `ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> fru edit` or via Redfish: `GET /Managers/1/FirmwareInventory`. Compare against vendor-published affected version ranges once available in the security advisory.Affected if The installed firmware version falls within the vendor-identified vulnerable version range (if published in the CVE advisory)
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Identify valid BMC user accountsList BMC user accounts that have SSH access: `ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> user list` or via Redfish /Managers/1/Accounts. Note which users have Administrator or Operator privileges.Affected if Any active user account with BMC access exists - authenticated attackers with SSH credentials can exploit the overflow
A user is affected if SSH access to the BMC is enabled and the firmware version matches the vulnerable range, allowing authenticated attackers to trigger the stack overflow via crafted SMASH-CLP commands.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict SSH access to trusted personnel and networks; apply vendor firmware patches when available; consider network isolating BMC interfaces.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-7623 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-7623 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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