CVE-2025-7704
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSupermicro BMC Insyde SMASH shell program has a stacked-based overflow vulnerability
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · low confidenceA stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Insyde SMASH shell program running on Supermicro Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs). The vulnerability could allow an authenticated attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service via the SMASH CLI interface.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Supermicro BMC firmware versionAccess the Supermicro BMC web interface or use IPMI command 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> fru print' or 'ipmitool mc info' to retrieve the firmware versionAffected if The installed firmware version falls within the affected version range for CVE-2025-7704 (compare to vendor-advisory version thresholds)
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Confirm SMASH CLI interface is enabledAccess BMC via IPMI: 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> raw <command>' or check BMC web interface under 'Remote Console' or 'IPMI' settings for SMASH/CLP availabilityAffected if SMASH (Server Management Array for Hardware) or CLP (Command Line Protocol) interface is exposed and accessible on the BMC
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Verify BMC network accessibilityPing the BMC IP address and check if ports 623 (UDP - IPMI) or 80/443 (web interface) are listening externally using 'nmap -p 623,80,443 <BMC_IP>' from an untrusted networkAffected if The BMC management interface is reachable from untrusted networks without network segmentation
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Check for authenticated user accessReview BMC user accounts via web interface or 'ipmitool -I lanplus -H <BMC_IP> -U <user> -P <pass> user list' to confirm active accountsAffected if Any valid BMC user credentials exist (the vulnerability requires authenticated access to SMASH CLI)
User is affected if the Supermicro BMC firmware is vulnerable, SMASH CLI is enabled, and the attacker can authenticate to the BMC interface.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor-supplied firmware updates for the Supermicro BMC when available. Restrict network access to the BMC management interface to trusted sources only.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-7704 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-7704 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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