CVE-2025-8404
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Supermicro BMC Shared library. An authenticated attacker with access to the BMC exploit stack buffer via a crafted header and achieve arbitrary code execution of the BMC’s firmware operating system.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Supermicro BMC (Baseboard Management Controller) shared library. An authenticated attacker with BMC network access can exploit this by sending a crafted header to trigger the overflow and achieve arbitrary code execution within the BMC firmware's operating system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if the system uses a Supermicro BMCAccess the BMC web interface or use IPMI commands (e.g., 'ipmitool -I open lan print' or check BMC model via 'ipmitool -I open mc info') to confirm the vendor is Supermicro and the component is a Baseboard Management ControllerAffected if The system is running a Supermicro BMC firmware
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Determine the installed BMC firmware versionUse IPMI command 'ipmitool -I open mc info' or check the BMC web interface firmware/version page to retrieve the current firmware build. Compare this version against any Supermicro security advisories for CVE-2025-8404Affected if The firmware version is lower than the patched version (if published) or unknown/older firmware builds are in use
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Verify BMC network accessibilityCheck if the BMC LAN interface is enabled and reachable: use 'ipmitool -I open lan print' to confirm IP address is assigned, and test network connectivity (ping, telnet, or HTTPS access to BMC web interface) from untrusted networksAffected if The BMC management interface is exposed to untrusted or management-untrusted networks
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Check for anomalous BMC authentication eventsReview BMC event logs via 'ipmitool -I open sel elist' or through the BMC web interface log section for suspicious authentication attempts, failed logins from unknown sources, or unusual command activityAffected if There are unexpected authentication events, especially from external IPs, or evidence of brute-force attempts against the BMC
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Confirm whether external authentication providers are configuredExamine BMC configuration for external LDAP/AD/RADIUS authentication settings via 'ipmitool -I open lan print' or web interface. Check if BMC user accounts with elevated privileges exist beyond expected defaultsAffected if The BMC accepts external authentication or has additional admin-level accounts that could be targeted
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Inspect BMC for unexpected processes or configuration changesIf access permits, review BMC network configuration, user account list ('ipmitool -I open user list'), and any recent changes to alert thresholds or network settings that were not initiated by administratorsAffected if Unexpected BMC configuration changes or unauthorized user accounts are present
The environment is likely affected if the system runs a Supermicro BMC with an older unpatched firmware version, the BMC interface is network-accessible to untrusted parties, and the attacker would need valid BMC credentials to exploit the stack buffer overflow via crafted headers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor-supplied firmware patch for the Supermicro BMC when available, and restrict BMC network access to trusted management networks or IPMI-only interfaces.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-8404 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-8404 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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