CVE-2025-9696
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe SunPower PVS6's BluetoothLE interface is vulnerable due to its use of hardcoded encryption parameters and publicly accessible protocol details. An attacker within Bluetooth range could exploit this vulnerability to gain full access to the device's servicing interface. This access allows the attacker to perform actions such as firmware replacement, disabling power production, modifying grid settings, creating SSH tunnels, altering firewall settings, and manipulating connected devices.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe SunPower PVS6's BluetoothLE interface uses hardcoded encryption parameters and exposes protocol details publicly. An attacker within Bluetooth range can intercept communications and gain full servicing interface access, enabling firmware replacement, power production control, grid setting modification, SSH tunnel creation, firewall changes, and device manipulation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm device model is SunPower PVS6Locate the physical device or check device inventory/documentation for the model number PVS6. This vulnerability affects only this specific inverter/model.Affected if The device is a SunPower PVS6 unit
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Verify BluetoothLE is enabledAccess the device management interface or check Bluetooth settings on the PVS6. Use Bluetooth scanner tools (such as nRF Connect or BLE Explorer) to detect if the PVS6 is broadcasting as a BLE device.Affected if BluetoothLE is actively broadcasting and discoverable
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Check firmware versionAccess the PVS6 web interface, mobile app, or use manufacturer diagnostic tools to retrieve the installed firmware version. Compare against any SunPower firmware release notes for your model.Affected if Firmware version matches the affected range for this CVE (no specific version range provided, so any unpatched version is potentially vulnerable)
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Inspect BluetoothLE service configurationConnect to the PVS6 via BluetoothLE and enumerate services/characteristics. Look for services that indicate servicing interface access (often labeled as debug, service, or admin functions). Check if authentication is required or if access is open.Affected if Servicing interface is accessible without proper authentication or uses known hardcoded parameters
A defender is affected if they have a SunPower PVS6 device with BluetoothLE enabled and the firmware has not been updated to address hardcoded encryption weaknesses in the BLE interface.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace hardcoded encryption parameters with dynamically generated keys, implement proper authentication for the BluetoothLE interface, and apply firmware updates that address the weak cryptographic implementation.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing16.0 h
- Review / QA8.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-9696 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-9696 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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