CVE-2025-9785
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPaperCut Print Deploy is an optional component that integrates with PaperCut NG/MF which simplifies printer deployment and management. When the component is deployed to an environment, the customer has an option to configure the system to use a self-signed certificate. If the customer does not fully configure the system to leverage the trust database on the clients, it opens up the communication between clients and the server to man-in-the-middle attacks. It was discovered that certain parts of the documentation related to the configuration of SSL in Print Deploy were lacking, which could potentially contribute to a misconfiguration of the Print Deploy client installation. PaperCut strongly recommends to use valid certificates to secure installations and to follow the updated documentation to ensure the correct SSL configuration. Those who use private CAs and/or self-signed certificates should make sure to copy their Certification Authority certificate, or their self signed certificate if using only one, to the trust store of their operating system and to the Java key store
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePaperCut Print Deploy contains incomplete SSL configuration documentation that can lead to improper client trust store setup when using self-signed or private CA certificates. This misconfiguration enables man-in-the-middle attacks on client-server communications.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PaperCut Print Deploy installationLocate the PaperCut Print Deploy installation directory (commonly C:\Program Files\PaperCut Print Deploy or /opt/papercut-print-deploy on Linux). Check for the presence of the main executable or service.Affected if PaperCut Print Deploy is installed and running in the environment
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Check for custom SSL certificate usageExamine the PaperCut Print Deploy configuration files (typically in the app directory or conf subfolder) for SSL/TLS settings. Look for references to custom keystores, truststores, or certificate paths. Also check if the server is configured to use HTTPS connections.Affected if The deployment uses custom/self-signed or private CA certificates for SSL/TLS connections rather than publicly-trusted certificates
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Verify certificate in OS trust storeOn Windows, use certmgr.msc or run 'certutil -store My' to list installed certificates. On Linux, check /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/ or the distribution-specific trust store location. Look for the private CA or self-signed certificate used by the PaperCut server.Affected if The custom certificate is NOT present in the OS-level trust store, only in application-level storage
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Verify certificate in Java keystoreLocate the Java keystore file used by PaperCut Print Deploy (commonly the JRE/lib/security/cacerts file or a custom keystore configured in startup scripts). Use keytool -list -keystore <path> to list certificates. Compare against the private CA or self-signed certificate in use.Affected if The custom certificate is NOT present in the Java keystore, creating an incomplete trust chain for Java-based client communications
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Inspect client configurationCheck client workstation configuration or deployment scripts for how clients validate the server certificate. Look for any documentation or configuration files that specify certificate trust requirements for client machines.Affected if Clients are configured to trust the server certificate but only through incomplete trust store setup (missing either OS or Java keystore entry)
The environment is affected if PaperCut Print Deploy is installed and uses custom SSL certificates where the CA certificate is missing from either the OS trust store or the Java keystore, leaving a trust gap that could be exploited for man-in-the-middle attacks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate documentation to clearly specify certificate installation to both OS trust store and Java keystore; use valid certificates where possible; follow vendor hardening guidelines.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2025-9785 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2025-9785 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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