GlobalprotectApplication · Paloaltonetworks
CVE-2026-0267
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAn information exposure vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app on macOS enables a local user to learn the configured passcodes for disabling, disconnecting, or uninstalling the GlobalProtect app. After the passcode is known, the user can perform these actions even if the GlobalProtect app configuration would not normally permit them to do so.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA local authenticated user on macOS can access configured passcodes stored by the GlobalProtect app, enabling them to disable, disconnect, or uninstall the application even when configuration policies would normally restrict these actions. This bypasses intended access controls by exposing sensitive passcode credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
GlobalprotectApplication
>= 6.2.0, < 6.2.8>= 6.3.0, < 6.3.3= 6.2.8= 6.3.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed GlobalProtect version on macOSOpen Terminal and run: defaults read /Applications/GlobalProtect.app/Contents/Info CFBundleShortVersionString 2>/dev/null || plutil -p /Applications/GlobalProtect.app/Contents/Info.plist | grep -i versionAffected if Version is 6.2.0 through 6.2.7, 6.3.0 through 6.3.2, or 6.2.8/6.3.3 (if interpretation includes these as affected)
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Locate passcode configuration storageSearch for passcode-related files: find /Library/Application\ Support/GlobalProtect -name '*passcode*' -o -name '*config*' 2>/dev/null; also check ~/Library/Application\ Support/GlobalProtect/Affected if Passcode configuration files exist on the system and are accessible to standard users
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Verify file permissions on passcode storageRun: ls -la <path-to-passcode-file> and check if the file is readable by non-admin users (permissions should not include 'r' for 'everyone' or group)Affected if Passcode files are readable by standard user accounts (world/group readable)
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Attempt read access as non-admin userCreate a standard test user or use an existing standard account, then attempt: cat /Library/Application\ Support/GlobalProtect/*/passcode* 2>/dev/nullAffected if Standard user can successfully read passcode configuration data in plain text or weakly encoded form
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Check for encryption in passcode storageOpen the passcode configuration file in a text editor or use: strings <passcode-file> | head -20, then verify if passcode values appear as plaintext or are properly encryptedAffected if Passcode values are stored in plaintext, easily decodable format, or with weak/obfuscated encryption
Your environment is affected if GlobalProtect version falls within 6.2.0-6.2.7 or 6.3.0-6.3.2 AND standard macOS users can read passcode configuration files from Application Support directories.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped6.2.86.3.3
Update to a patched version of GlobalProtect that properly protects passcode configuration from local access. As a temporary measure, review and rotate any potentially exposed passcodes.
GlobalProtect 6.2.8 or later; GlobalProtect 6.3.3 or later
- Identify the currently installed GlobalProtect version on macOS by checking the app info or running: defaults read /Applications/GlobalProtect.app/Contents/Info CFBundleShortVersionString
- Determine which version branch is in use (6.2.x or 6.3.x)
- For GlobalProtect 6.2.x: Upgrade to version 6.2.8 or later
- For GlobalProtect 6.3.x: Upgrade to version 6.3.3 or later
- Download the updated installer from the Palo Alto Networks Customer Support Portal or official download channels
- Install the updated GlobalProtect app following standard macOS application update procedures
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the installed version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Globalprotect
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-0267 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-0267 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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