ZephyrOperating system · Zephyrproject

CVE-2026-10637

HIGH · 7.1 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-16
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to 4.5.0 or later.
See remediation →
76/100
Remediation priority · High
Public exploit No privileges Zero-click Patch available

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
subsys/net/ip/ipv6_mld.c:mld_send() read the packet interface via net_pkt_iface(pkt) after net_send_data(pkt) returned successfully. Per the network stack's ownership contract (include/zephyr/net/net_core.h, and the explicit warning in subsys/net/ip/net_core.c:453-460 'do not use pkt after that call'), a successful send transfers ownership of the net_pkt and the L2 driver frees it (e.g. ethernet_send() unrefs the packet on success, subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c:790), returning it to its k_mem_slab. The subsequent net_pkt_iface(pkt) is therefore a read of a freed object; the recovered interface pointer is then dereferenced and incremented by the per-interface statistics path (net_stats.h UPDATE_STAT/SET_STAT) when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE is enabled. If the freed slot is concurrently reallocated, pkt->iface may read back as NULL (NULL-pointer dereference / crash) or as a stale/garbage pointer (stray increment write / memory corruption). The path is reachable remotely on the local link without authentication: handle_mld_query() (registered for NET_ICMPV6_MLD_QUERY) responds to a valid MLDv2 General Query (unspecified multicast address, hop limit 1) by calling send_mld_report() -> mld_send(). The result is a remotely triggerable denial of service of the networking stack, with a narrow possibility of memory corruption. The fix caches the interface in a local before sending and no longer touches the packet after net_send_data(). The IPv4/IGMP sibling (igmp_send) already used the corrected pattern.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis
How this class of weakness works · CWE-416

Memory is used after it has been freed, so its contents — now potentially attacker-controlled — drive the program's behaviour. With careful heap grooming this becomes code execution. The fix requires disciplined ownership of memory and often a targeted rework of the object lifecycle.

General guidance for the use after free class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
ZephyrOperating system
Affected:>= 1.12.0, < 4.5.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Adjacent
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Upgrade available Upgrade to 4.5.0 or later
Fixed in 4.5.0
Vendor patch github.com →
Recommended fix High confidence

Zephyr >= 4.5.0

  1. 1. Identify the Zephyr version currently in use by checking the version string in the application or build system (e.g., check zephyr/version.h or the west manifest)
  2. 2. Navigate to the Zephyr project repository at https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr
  3. 3. Locate and review commit 3159c53e8e7d233c2a85a0798cf25ac441db6dae which contains the fix for the Use After Free in mld_send()
  4. 4. Verify the fix pattern: ensure the code now caches net_pkt_iface(pkt) in a local variable BEFORE calling net_send_data(pkt), and uses that cached value for any post-send operations
  5. 5. If using a version < 4.5.0, upgrade to Zephyr version 4.5.0 or later which contains the patched code
  6. 6. Rebuild the application with the updated Zephyr version
  7. 7. Test the networking functionality, particularly IPv6 multicast (MLD) operations, to verify the fix does not introduce regressions
  8. 8. If upgrade is not immediately feasible, apply the vendor patch from commit 3159c53e8e7d233c2a85a0798cf25ac441db6dae to local Zephyr tree: modify subsys/net/ip/ipv6_mld.c to cache the interface pointer before net_send_data() call
Caveat Upgrading to Zephyr 4.x may introduce breaking API changes from previous 3.x releases; review the Zephyr release notes for migration requirements

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-10637 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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