CVE-2026-11473
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was identified in jflyfox jfinal_cms up to 5.1.0. This impacts the function list of the file AdvicefeedbackController.java. Such manipulation of the argument orderBy leads to sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSQL injection vulnerability in jflyfox jfinal_cms up to version 5.1.0. The list function of AdvicefeedbackController.java does not properly sanitize the orderBy parameter, allowing an attacker to manipulate SQL queries through this input vector. The vulnerability is exploitable remotely.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm jfinal_cms is deployedLocate the jfinal_cms application directory or WAR file in your environment. Check for the presence of the AdvicefeedbackController.java file within the source code or decompiled JAR.Affected if The application is jfinal_cms and the AdvicefeedbackController.java file exists in the codebase.
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Identify the installed versionFind the version identifier in your jfinal_cms deployment. This may be in a pom.xml, build.gradle, version file, or Maven/Gradle metadata. Common locations include the project root, a version.properties file, or the WAR archive manifest.Affected if The version is 5.1.0 or any earlier version (e.g., 5.0.x, 4.x.x).
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Verify the vulnerable code path existsLocate AdvicefeedbackController.java in the source code and inspect the list function. Look for code that accepts an 'orderBy' parameter from the request and concatenates it directly into a SQL query string without using parameterized queries or input validation.Affected if The list function contains code that uses the orderBy parameter in a SQL query via string concatenation or string formatting (e.g., 'SELECT ... ORDER BY ' + orderBy).
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Confirm the endpoint is accessibleIdentify the URL path mapped to the AdvicefeedbackController list function (typically /advicefeedback/list or similar). Verify the web application is running and this endpoint is accessible via HTTP/HTTPS.Affected if The application exposes an HTTP endpoint that triggers the vulnerable list function.
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Check database query execution contextReview the DAO or service layer that executes the constructed SQL query. Confirm that no input sanitization, allowlist validation, or framework query builders with parameterized order clauses are used for the orderBy value.Affected if The orderBy parameter flows from the controller to the SQL execution without sanitization or parameterization.
You are affected if you are running jfinal_cms version 5.1.0 or earlier, the AdvicefeedbackController.java file exists in your deployment, and the list function handles an orderBy parameter via direct string concatenation in SQL queries without sanitization.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement parameterized queries or proper input validation/sanitization for the orderBy parameter in the affected AdvicefeedbackController.java list function. Until an official patch is released, consider implementing WAF rules to filter malicious orderBy input.
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- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-11473 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-11473 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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