CVE-2026-11819
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedModule: plugins/modules/keyring_info.py CVSS 3.1: 5.5 MEDIUM — AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Issue: The module retrieves a passphrase from the OS native keyring (GNOME Keyring, macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager) and places it directly into result["passphrase"] with no output suppression, no no_log protection, and no documentation warning. Root Cause: Line 105 (protected): keyring_password=dict(type="str", required=True, no_log=True) Line 127 (NOT protected): result["passphrase"] = passphrase Observed Output: { "changed": false, "passphrase": "MyMasterP@ssw0rd!SSH_Key_Secret" } Visible via register + debug: { "keyring_result": { "changed": false, "passphrase": "MyMasterP@ssw0rd!SSH_Key_Secret" } } Impact: Master passwords, SSH key passphrases and service credentials appear in all Ansible output register: keyring_result followed by debug: var=keyring_result prints passphrase in full Ansible fact caching backends (Redis, JSON file, memcached) may persist the passphrase AWX/Tower job logs silently store the live credential Fix: module.exit_json(changed=False, passphrase=passphrase, _ansible_no_log=True) Also add a documentation warning requiring callers to use no_log: true at the task level. PoCs Fig 1: PoC execution showing passphrase in plaintext output Fig 2: Source code showing no_log=True on input (line 105) vs unprotected output (line 127)
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe keyring_info.py Ansible module retrieves passphrases from OS native keyrings (GNOME Keyring, macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager) but outputs them in plaintext without no_log protection. While the input parameter (line 105) is correctly marked no_log=True, the output assignment at line 127 (`result['passphrase'] = passphrase`) exposes the sensitive credential in module return data.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the keyring_info.py Ansible module fileSearch common Ansible library paths such as /usr/lib/python*/site-packages/ansible/modules/keyring_info.py, ./library/keyring_info.py in your playbook repository, or use 'find / -name keyring_info.py 2>/dev/null' to locate it.Affected if The module file exists in your Ansible environment.
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Inspect the module source code for plaintext passphrase outputOpen the keyring_info.py file and examine line 127 (or nearby lines) for the pattern result['passphrase'] = passphrase without any no_log or masked variable assignment.Affected if The code contains result['passphrase'] = passphrase that outputs the raw credential value.
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Verify exit_json lacks no_log protectionSearch the module for the module.exit_json() call and check whether no_log=True is set on that call, or whether the passphrase key is omitted from the return dictionary.Affected if The exit_json call does not have no_log=True and returns the passphrase in plaintext.
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Review task definitions using this moduleSearch your playbooks and roles for 'keyring_info' module usage with grep -r 'keyring_info' and examine any tasks that call it.Affected if Playbooks invoke the keyring_info module to retrieve passphrases.
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Audit Ansible output and logs for exposed credentialsRun a playbook using keyring_info and inspect stdout, callback logs, and any fact caching files (JSON/YAML in /var/tmp/ansible_facts or similar) for plaintext passphrase strings.Affected if Passphrase values appear in cleartext in Ansible output, logs, or cached fact files.
If the keyring_info.py module is deployed in your environment and returns passphrase data through exit_json without no_log=True protection, sensitive credentials are being exposed in module return data.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAdd `no_log=True` to the module.exit_json() call and update module documentation to warn users they must set no_log: true at the task level to prevent credential exposure in Ansible output, logs, and fact caching backends.
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- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-11819 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-11819 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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