CVE-2026-12218
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was detected in Yealink SIP-T46U 108.87.50.1. The affected element is the function StartReportInformation of the file /api/inner/beforewifitest of the component Web FastCGI Service. The manipulation of the argument port results in stack-based buffer overflow. Access to the local network is required for this attack. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and is working on a patch to fix it.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in Yealink SIP-T46U phone firmware (v108.87.50.1) Web FastCGI Service. The /api/inner/beforewifitest endpoint's StartReportInformation function fails to properly bounds-check the 'port' argument, allowing attackers with local network access to overflow the stack and potentially execute arbitrary code.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelCheck the device label or access the web interface and look for the model number in the system information or status pageAffected if Device is not a Yealink SIP-T46U IP phone
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Determine the firmware versionAccess the web interface, navigate to Status or System Info page to view the firmware version. Compare against v108.87.50.1Affected if Firmware version is v108.87.50.1 or lower
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Verify the web interface is network accessibleAttempt to reach the device's IP address on HTTP port 80 or HTTPS port 443 from a remote hostAffected if Web interface responds to network requests (vulnerable service is exposed)
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Confirm the vulnerable endpoint existsSend a GET or POST request to /api/inner/beforewifitest endpoint with any 'port' parameter value and observe the responseAffected if Endpoint responds (indicates the vulnerable WiFi testing functionality is enabled)
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Assess network exposureDetermine if the device IP is reachable from untrusted network segments, VLANs, or the internet by reviewing network topology and firewall rulesAffected if Device web interface is accessible from untrusted or external networks
You are affected if you have a Yealink SIP-T46U running firmware v108.87.50.1 or lower with the web interface accessible from a network where untrusted attackers can reach the /api/inner/beforewifitest endpoint.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor firmware patch when released; until then, isolate affected devices on restricted VLANs and disable the web interface or limit access to trusted management subnets.
- Restrict network access to the Yealink SIP‑T46U web interface by placing it behind a firewall or using ACLs to allow only trusted IP addresses, as the attack requires local network access.
- If the web FastCGI service is not required, disable it via the device’s management interface or firmware settings.
- Monitor Yealink’s official support channels (firmware release notes, security advisories) for the upcoming patch that addresses the stack‑based buffer overflow in /api/inner/beforewifitest (argument port).
- Once the vendor releases a firmware update that includes the fix, schedule a maintenance window, back up the device configuration, and upgrade the device to the fixed firmware version.
- After applying the patch, verify that the vulnerability is resolved and that the device operates normally.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-12218 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-12218 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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