CVE-2026-12388
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw was found in the Identity Provider (IdP) mapper component of Keycloak, which is used to manage how user information from external services is mapped to Keycloak users. An administrator with limited permissions to manage identity providers can exploit this flaw by creating a "Hardcoded Role" mapper that assigns high-level administrative roles (like realm-admin) to themselves or others. This allows a restricted administrator to bypass security checks and gain full control over the entire realm.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Identity Provider mapper component in Keycloak allows creating 'Hardcoded Role' mappers that assign specific roles to users from external identity providers. A restricted administrator with permission to manage IdP mappers can exploit this by creating a mapper that assigns high-level roles like realm-admin to themselves or other users, achieving privilege escalation to full realm administration.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Keycloak versionCheck the installed version of Red Hat Build of Keycloak using the server banner or admin console 'Server Info' section. Compare against vendor advisory for CVE-2026-12388.Affected if The installed version is any version of Red Hat Build of Keycloak (all versions are affected).
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Identify configured Identity ProvidersIn Keycloak admin console, navigate to 'Identity Providers' under the realm settings. List all IdP instances configured in the realm.Affected if Any Identity Provider is configured - this creates the attack surface for the vulnerability.
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Review Hardcoded Role mappersFor each configured Identity Provider, go to the 'Mappers' tab and search for mappers of type 'Hardcoded Role'. List all such mappers and record the role they assign.Affected if Any Hardcoded Role mapper exists that assigns elevated roles such as realm-admin, admin, or other high-privilege roles.
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Audit permissions on IdP mapper managementCheck which users or groups have 'identity-provider mapper' management permissions in the realm's authorization settings or admin permissions. Identify non-realm-admin users with these rights.Affected if Any non-realm-admin user or service account has permission to create or modify Identity Provider mappers.
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Review role assignments from IdP mappersExamine all IdP mappers (not just Hardcoded Role) to identify which roles they collectively assign to users authenticating via each IdP. Cross-reference with elevated privilege roles.Affected if IdP mappers collectively assign realm-admin or other critical administrative roles to users authenticating through external IdPs.
A user is affected if they run any version of Red Hat Build of Keycloak with configured Identity Providers and have non-realm-admin users with permission to manage IdP mappers, or if suspicious Hardcoded Role mappers assigning elevated roles already exist.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict or disable the ability for non-realm-admin users to create or modify Identity Provider mappers. Audit existing IdP mapper configurations for unauthorized hardcoded role assignments and remove any suspicious mappers. Apply vendor patches when released.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-12388 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-12388 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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