CVE-2026-12428
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Blocks for ACF Fields plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the get_all_values() function in the /wp-json/acf-field-blocks/v1/values REST endpoint in versions up to, and including, 1.6.2. The permission_callback only verifies the generic publish_posts capability and the handler passes a user-supplied id parameter directly to get_field_objects() without verifying that the requesting user is authorized to read the target object. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to read ACF field values from arbitrary posts (including private posts, drafts, posts by other users, and other ACF-supported objects) that they should not have access to.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Blocks for ACF Fields WordPress plugin has an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in its REST API endpoint /wp-json/acf-field-blocks/v1/values. The endpoint's permission_callback only checks the generic publish_posts capability and passes a user-supplied id parameter directly to get_field_objects() without verifying the requesting user has authorization to read the target post's ACF field values. This allows any authenticated user with Author-level access or higher to read ACF field data from arbitrary posts including private posts, drafts, and posts authored by other users.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm plugin installation and versionNavigate to WordPress admin > Plugins and locate 'Blocks for ACF Fields' (or 'acf-field-blocks'), or inspect the plugin file header in wp-content/plugins/acf-field-blocks/readme.txt for the Version fieldAffected if The installed version is below 1.6.3 (e.g., 1.6.2, 1.6.1, 1.5.0, etc.)
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Verify the vulnerable REST endpoint existsSend a request to /wp-json/acf-field-blocks/v1/values or inspect the plugin's registration code for rest_route 'acf-field-blocks/v1/values'Affected if The endpoint is registered and responds to requests (even if returning error, the route exists)
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Test endpoint authorization behaviorUsing a low-privilege authenticated user (Author role), send a GET request to /wp-json/acf-field-blocks/v1/values?id={post_id} where {post_id} is a private post or a post authored by a different userAffected if The endpoint returns ACF field data for posts the user should not have permission to read (private posts, drafts, other users' posts)
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Inspect the permission_callback implementationExamine the plugin code where rest_api_register_hooks or register_rest_route is called for 'acf-field-blocks/v1/values' and check if permission_callback validates user can read the specific post by IDAffected if The permission_callback only checks a generic capability like 'publish_posts' without verifying post-specific read access
Your environment is affected if the Blocks for ACF Fields plugin is installed with a version below 1.6.3 AND the REST endpoint /wp-json/acf-field-blocks/v1/values is accessible to authenticated users who can read posts they do not own.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to version 1.6.3 or later which should include proper capability checks. The fix requires implementing role-based access control that verifies the current user has appropriate read permissions for the specific post being requested.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-12428 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-12428 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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