CVE-2026-12602
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedIncorrect default permissions in ArubaSign, affecting versions prior to v4.6.6. The vulnerability is caused by the assignment of inappropriate permissions during the software’s default installation, whereby the main executable and other programme files located in C:\Program Files have excessive permissions for the ‘Everyone’ group. This could allow an unprivileged user to replace the main executable and/or its components with a malicious file, thereby enabling the execution of arbitrary code. In the worst-case scenario, if the malicious code is executed with elevated privileges (such as those of Administrator or SYSTEM), the attacker could escalate privileges and gain full control of the system, compromising both security and data integrity.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceArubaSign versions prior to v4.6.6 ship with insecure default file system permissions, granting the 'Everyone' group excessive write/modify access to the application directory in C:\Program Files. This allows any local unprivileged user to replace the main executable or supporting DLLs with malicious equivalents, achieving arbitrary code execution—potentially at elevated privileges if the application runs as a privileged service account.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- Authentication
- X
- User interaction
- P
- Scope
- X
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate ArubaSign installation directoryCheck C:\Program Files for an 'ArubaSign' folder, or search for ArubaSign.exe using 'Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ProgramFiles -Recurse -Filter ArubaSign.exe -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue'Affected if The application is installed in C:\Program Files
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Determine installed versionRight-click ArubaSign.exe, select Properties, then look at the 'Details' tab for the Product Version, or run '(Get-Item "C:\Program Files\ArubaSign\ArubaSign.exe").VersionInfo.FileVersion'Affected if Version is earlier than 4.6.6 (e.g., 4.6.5, 4.6.0, etc.)
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Inspect directory permissions for Everyone groupRight-click the ArubaSign folder in C:\Program Files, select Properties > Security tab, and verify if 'Everyone' is listed under 'Group or user names'; if present, click Edit to see its permissionsAffected if 'Everyone' group is present and has Write or Modify permissions
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Verify executable and DLL permissionsOpen Security tab for ArubaSign.exe and any DLLs in the folder, check if 'Everyone' has Write or Modify permissions, or run 'icacls "C:\Program Files\ArubaSign\*"' to list all permissionsAffected if The main executable or supporting DLLs grant Everyone write or modify access
A user is affected if ArubaSign is installed with a version prior to v4.6.6 AND the installation directory or its executables grant the Everyone group write or modify permissions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to ArubaSign v4.6.6 or later which includes corrected default ACLs, or manually remediate by removing 'Everyone' and unnecessary group permissions from the installation directory and enforcing least-privilege access controls.
ArubaSign v4.6.6
- Upgrade ArubaSign to version 4.6.6 or later to resolve the incorrect default permissions vulnerability
- Verify the upgrade by checking file permissions on the ArubaSign installation directory in C:\Program Files to confirm the 'Everyone' group no longer has excessive permissions
- Test the upgraded application to ensure functionality remains intact
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,880.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-12602 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-12602 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data