The EPSS score of 0.00262 assigned to CVE-2026-12713 badly misrepresents its actual risk profile. This is an unauthenticated SQL injection in WPCargo, a WordPress shipment tracking plugin with over 10,000 active installations — and critically, it is the second SQL injection vulnerability in this plugin in under two years. CVE-2024-44004 already forced a patch for an injection point in WPCargo. Now CVE-2026-12713 reveals a separate, previously unknown injection path in the same plugin. This is not a regression or new bug emerging in previously secure code — it is a latent consequence of incomplete remediation. The first patch addressed one code path without auditing for the same vulnerability class across the codebase.

This pattern demands a fundamentally different defensive posture. When a vendor demonstrates shallow root-cause analysis — fixing one instance without checking for the same vulnerability class throughout their code — the standard assumption that patching follows diminishing returns breaks down. Treat any SQL injection in a plugin with prior SQL injection history as a class confirmation, not an isolated instance. Audit the plugin codebase for the same sanitization function, query builder pattern, or database operation that was vulnerable in CVE-2024-44004. If that pattern appears elsewhere, treat it as exploitable until proven otherwise.

The vendor's patch in version 8.0.4 should be treated as partially trustworthy until an independent audit confirms comprehensive remediation. The absence of changelog language indicating 'security hardening across all database operations' — versus merely 'fixed reported vulnerability' — is itself a signal. Apply a residual risk multiplier of at minimum 2-3x the raw EPSS score against the asset's exposure tier. An unauthenticated injection in a shipment-tracking plugin handling customer PII warrants immediate patching regardless of what exploit prediction scores suggest.

Beyond patching, recognize that the CVE closure mechanism itself created a temporal exposure gap. From the moment CVE-2024-44004 was published as 'patched,' defenders began de-prioritizing scrutiny of this codebase. Attackers did not. They continued auditing with full knowledge of the first injection pattern, while defenders had institutional incentive to move on. The exposure window between the two CVEs was actively widened by the false closure signal. This temporal exposure debt — the accumulated gap between when defenders thought they were secure and when they actually are — is a compounding risk factor that prioritization models should capture but rarely do.