dbcve.org
Improper AuthenticationWeakness · CWE-287

CVE-2026-12761

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-10
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 6 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The miniOrange Social Login and Register (Discord, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass leading to account takeover in versions up to and including 7.7.0. This is due to the Profile Completion flow accepting an arbitrary email address via the 'email_field' POST parameter without verifying that the email belongs to the identity returned by the OAuth provider, combined with send_otp_token() returning the SHA-512(customer_key || otp) transaction hash to the client where the OTP space is only 99,000 values (wp_rand(1000, 99999)) and the customer_key is a static option (empty on unregistered installs). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trigger an OTP email to an arbitrary admin's address, crack the OTP offline from the leaked hash in under a second, and submit the cracked OTP to mo_openid_social_login_validate_otp(), which logs the attacker in as the user whose email was supplied — granting full administrator access.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The miniOrange Social Login plugin for WordPress has an authentication bypass vulnerability in versions up to 7.7.0. The Profile Completion flow accepts any email address via POST parameter without validating ownership against the OAuth provider identity. Combined with send_otp_token() leaking a SHA-512 hash of the OTP (which has only 99,000 possible values) to the client, attackers can trigger an OTP to an admin email, crack the hash offline in seconds, and submit it to the validation function to gain full administrator access.

MitigationUpgrade to a version beyond 7.7.0 that properly verifies email ownership during OAuth profile completion and implements a cryptographically secure OTP mechanism with proper server-side validation and no hash leakage to clients.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed plugin version
    Navigate to WordPress admin dashboard > Plugins > Installed Plugins. Locate 'miniOrange Social Login' and note the version number displayed. Alternatively, check the plugin's main PHP file header or version.php for the Version constant.
    Affected if Version is 7.7.0 or lower (any version up to and including 7.7.0)
  2. Verify OAuth login methods are configured
    Access the plugin settings page (usually under 'miniOrange Social Login' in the admin menu). Review the configured social login providers (such as Google, Facebook, GitHub, etc.). Check whether any OAuth provider is enabled and connected.
    Affected if At least one OAuth provider is configured and enabled in the plugin settings
  3. Confirm profile completion feature exists
    Inspect the plugin's frontend behavior during OAuth login. When authenticating with an OAuth provider, observe whether the plugin presents a 'profile completion' form prompting for email address or other user details before creating the WordPress account.
    Affected if The plugin displays a profile completion form that accepts user input (particularly email) after OAuth authentication
  4. Test OTP hash leakage behavior
    Use a web proxy or browser developer tools to capture the HTTP response from the plugin when an OTP is triggered. Locate the send_otp_token() function response and inspect whether it contains a SHA-512 hash value visible in the client-side response rather than only server-side validation.
    Affected if The OTP trigger response includes a SHA-512 hash string exposed to the client browser

The environment is affected if miniOrange Social Login plugin version 7.7.0 or lower is installed with any OAuth provider enabled, as the combination of unvalidated email acceptance in profile completion and client-side OTP hash leakage allows authentication bypass to administrator accounts.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to a version beyond 7.7.0 that properly verifies email ownership during OAuth profile completion and implements a cryptographically secure OTP mechanism with proper server-side validation and no hash leakage to clients.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

7.7.1 or later (check WordPress plugin repository for latest stable release)

  1. 1. Navigate to the WordPress admin dashboard
  2. 2. Go to Plugins > Installed Plugins
  3. 3. Locate the miniOrange Social Login and Register plugin
  4. 4. Check the current version installed (should be 7.7.0 or below)
  5. 5. If an update is available, click 'Update Now' to install version 7.7.1 or later
  6. 6. Verify the update completed successfully
  7. 7. Test the social login functionality to ensure it still works correctly
  8. 8. Consider changing administrative passwords as a precautionary measure

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing8.0 h
  • Review / QA6.0 h
34.0 hours of engineering $5,960
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-12761 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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