CVE-2026-14245
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.5.1. This is due to the `um_reset_password_process_hook()` function performing no server-side verification that the OTP validation step was completed, and relying solely on a public `form_nonce` nonce that the plugin itself emits to unauthenticated visitors via the `moumprvar` JavaScript object on the Ultimate Member password reset page, while still accepting the attacker-controlled `username_b` parameter to target any WordPress user without role restriction or any binding to a previously validated OTP session. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a freshly generated password-reset URL for an arbitrary Administrator account — returned in a 302 `Location` header — and use it to take full control of that account. Exploitation requires the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration to be active and the plugin to not be configured for phone-only reset.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe miniOrange OTP Login plugin for WordPress has an authentication bypass in the `um_reset_password_process_hook()` function. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to reset any user's password (including administrators) because the function fails to verify that OTP validation was completed server-side. It relies only on a client-side `form_nonce` and accepts an attacker-controlled `username_b` parameter without any session binding to a previously validated OTP, enabling full account takeover.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm miniOrange OTP Login plugin is installedIn WordPress admin, go to Plugins > Installed Plugins and look for 'miniOrange OTP Login' or check the wp-content/plugins directory for miniOrange-related foldersAffected if The plugin is installed and active
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Check Ultimate Member password reset integration settingNavigate to the plugin settings (miniOrange OTP Login > Password Reset settings) and verify if the 'Ultimate Member Password Reset Form' integration is enabledAffected if The Ultimate Member password reset form integration is turned on
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Verify server-side OTP validation exists in the plugin codeInspect the plugin files for the function um_reset_password_process_hook() and confirm whether it performs server-side OTP validation and session binding, or only relies on client-side form_nonceAffected if The function lacks proper server-side OTP verification and session binding for the username_b parameter
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Compare installed version to affected releasesCheck the plugin version in WordPress plugin list or in the plugin's readme.txt file and compare against any official vendor security advisoriesAffected if The installed version has not been patched for CVE-2026-14245
The environment is affected if the miniOrange OTP Login plugin is active with Ultimate Member password reset integration enabled and the um_reset_password_process_hook function does not perform server-side OTP validation with session binding.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration if not required, or configure the plugin for phone-only reset mode. Apply the vendor patch immediately when available.
- Consultation5.0 h
- Implementation10.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA5.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-14245 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-14245 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data