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Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)Weakness · CWE-918

CVE-2026-14336

HIGH · 8.2 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-07-02
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
91/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click 8 weeks old

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
PIA's OIDC issuer allowlist for Jenkins tokens uses a bare string-prefix check (issuer.startswith(' https://ci.eclipse.org ') in is_issuer_known, pia/models.py:139) instead of validating the issuer as a properly host-bounded URL. An attacker can craft an issuer such as https://[email protected] (userinfo trick) or https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host (suffix trick) that satisfies the prefix check while pointing the OIDC discovery and JWKS fetches at a server the attacker controls. An unauthenticated caller of POST /v1/upload/sbom can use this to force PIA to make outbound HTTP(S) requests to an arbitrary attacker-chosen host, and to have oidc.verify_token accept a JWT signed with the attacker's own key.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The PIA OIDC issuer validation in pia/models.py:139 uses a simple string prefix check (issuer.startswith('https://ci.eclipse.org')) instead of properly parsing and validating the URL host component. This allows attackers to bypass the check using malicious issuers like 'https://[email protected]' (userinfo trick) or 'https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host' (suffix trick), enabling SSRF via the /v1/upload/sbom endpoint and acceptance of attacker-signed JWTs.

MitigationReplace the prefix-based issuer check with proper URL parsing that extracts and validates the host component strictly, ensuring the issuer URL's host exactly matches the expected domain without any userinfo or suffix manipulation.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Locate the vulnerable validation code
    Find the file pia/models.py and inspect line 139 (or nearby lines) for the OIDC issuer validation logic. Look for a string prefix check such as issuer.startswith('https://ci.eclipse.org')
    Affected if The code uses a simple startswith() check on the issuer string rather than parsing and validating the URL host component
  2. Verify the issuer validation method
    Examine how the issuer parameter is validated. Confirm whether the code extracts and validates only the host portion of the URL or performs a raw string prefix match
    Affected if The validation uses string prefix matching (startswith) instead of proper URL parsing that isolates the host component
  3. Check for userinfo and suffix bypass vectors
    Review the validation logic to determine if it strips or rejects userinfo (the @ symbol portion) and does not enforce an exact host match without additional suffixes
    Affected if The code does not reject issuers like 'https://[email protected]' or 'https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host' and accepts them as valid
  4. Confirm the affected endpoint is accessible
    Determine if the /v1/upload/sbom endpoint is exposed in the deployment. Check server configuration or API routing to see if this endpoint accepts OIDC-authenticated requests
    Affected if The /v1/upload/sbom endpoint is enabled and processes requests using the vulnerable issuer validation

You are affected if pia/models.py contains a startswith-based issuer check at line 139 that does not properly parse the URL host, allowing malicious issuers with userinfo or suffix tricks to bypass validation.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Replace the prefix-based issuer check with proper URL parsing that extracts and validates the host component strictly, ensuring the issuer URL's host exactly matches the expected domain without any userinfo or suffix manipulation.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence
  1. Review the code in pia/models.py around line 139 where the issuer validation occurs
  2. Replace the insecure prefix check (issuer.startswith()) with proper URL parsing using Python's urllib.parse
  3. Validate that the parsed URL's netloc (host) exactly matches 'ci.eclipse.org' without any userinfo or additional hostname suffixes
  4. Ensure no characters (including @ or additional domain segments) exist after the legitimate host
  5. Apply the same validation fix to any other OIDC issuer validation logic in the codebase
  6. After patching, test with malicious issuer strings like 'https://[email protected]' and 'https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host' to confirm they are rejected

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing6.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
22.0 hours of engineering $3,860
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-14336 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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What this is

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What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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