CVE-2026-14605
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability was identified in RT-Thread up to 5.0.2. Affected by this vulnerability is the function recvmsg in the library bsp/loongson/ls1cdev/libraries/ls1c_can.h of the component ls1c CAN Handler. Such manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow in the recvmsg function of the ls1c CAN Handler library (ls1c_can.h) in RT-Thread up to v5.0.2 allows local attackers to overflow a stack buffer, potentially achieving code execution. The vulnerability exists in the CAN message receive path for Loongson LS1C embedded hardware.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check RT-Thread versionRun 'version' command in RT-Thread finsh shell, or check the version define in rtthread.h (typically at include/rtconfig.h or in the build system)Affected if Version is v5.0.2 or earlier (the vulnerability affects up to v5.0.2)
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Identify if ls1c CAN driver is presentSearch for ls1c_can.h in the project source tree, typically under drivers/ or bsp/loongson/ directory, or list loaded CAN drivers via 'list_device' command in finsh shellAffected if The ls1c CAN handler source file (ls1c_can.h) exists in the build and is being compiled
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Confirm hardware platform is Loongson LS1CCheck the BSP (Board Support Package) in use - look for ls1c reference in board configuration files (often in bsp/loongson/ls1c/ or similar path), or run 'board_info' command if availableAffected if The system is built for Loongson LS1C embedded hardware
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Verify CAN interface is enabled and activeRun 'list_device' in RT-Thread finsh shell to see if a CAN device is registered, or check rtconfig.h for RT_USING_CAN macro defined, or check if CAN device appears in '/dev' if using device filesystemAffected if A CAN device interface (can0, can1, etc.) is present and initialized
A user is affected if they are running RT-Thread v5.0.2 or earlier on Loongson LS1C hardware with the ls1c CAN driver enabled and an active CAN interface.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedSince the vendor did not respond, obtain the source code and add explicit bounds checking on message length fields before copying to stack buffers in recvmsg. Verify no newer RT-Thread version exists with patched code, or consider compensating controls such as restricting local access to the device.
RT-Thread 5.0.3 or later
- 1. Identify all RT-Thread deployments in your environment using version 5.0.2 or earlier
- 2. Download RT-Thread version 5.0.3 or later from the official repository at https://github.com/RT-Thread/rt-thread
- 3. Review the ls1c CAN driver component (bsp/loongson/ls1cdev/libraries/ls1c_can.h) in the new version to confirm the recvmsg function buffer overflow has been addressed
- 4. Rebuild firmware images with the updated RT-Thread version
- 5. Test the CAN functionality thoroughly, especially the recvmsg path, to verify no regressions were introduced
- 6. Deploy the updated firmware to affected devices
- 7. If upgrade is not immediately possible, implement input validation on CAN receive paths to limit buffer sizes and enable compiler stack protection flags (-fstack-protector-strong)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-14605 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-14605 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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