CVE-2026-14614
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw was found in the ClientResource component of Keycloak's admin services when Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAP) v2 is enabled. This issue allows a delegated administrator, who should only have limited control over specific clients, to attach or remove hidden client scopes that they are not authorized to see or manage. As a result, an attacker could inject unauthorized data or permissions into the security tokens issued to end-users, potentially tricking other applications into granting higher levels of access than intended.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceIn Keycloak with Fine-Grained Admin Permissions v2 (FGAPv2) enabled, the ClientResource component fails to properly restrict delegated administrators from attaching or removing hidden client scopes they are not authorized to manage. This permission bypass allows limited admins to modify security token generation by adding unauthorized client scopes, potentially escalating privileges in downstream applications that trust Keycloak-issued tokens.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 26.4, < 26.4.14>= 26.6, < 26.6.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify FGAP v2 is enabledIn Keycloak admin console, go to Realm Settings > General tab and check if 'Fine-Grained Admin Permissions' is enabled, or query the realm representation via API: GET /admin/realms/{realm} and look for 'fineGrainedPermissionEnabled' set to trueAffected if FGAP v2 is enabled (fineGrainedPermissionEnabled = true)
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Identify delegated admins with client permissionsIn Keycloak admin console, go to Users or Roles section and look for users/role composites that have client-level admin permissions (admin-permissions on specific clients), or query: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client-uuid}/roles and review role assignmentsAffected if Delegated administrators exist with client-scoped admin roles that can manage client scopes
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Review client scope assignments for unauthorized scopesQuery client scopes for each client: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client-uuid}/client-scopes and compare against what the delegated admin should have access to. Check both 'default' and 'optional' client scope mappingsAffected if Hidden or sensitive client scopes (e.g., groups, roles, audience) are attached to clients that the delegated admin should not be able to modify
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Audit client scope permission grantsCheck the permission representation for client scopes: GET /admin/realms/{realm}/clients/{client-uuid}/evaluate-scopes and review which scopes the current user is authorized to manage. Also check Realm Authorization settings for scope-based permissionsAffected if The delegated admin can attach scopes they are not explicitly authorized to manage per FGAP permissions
User is affected if FGAP v2 is enabled AND they have delegated administrators with client-level permissions that can modify client scopes beyond their intended authorization.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data26.4.1426.6.5
Ensure FGAPv2 configurations strictly enforce scope-level permissions for delegated administrators, preventing access to hidden client scopes. Consider reviewing and restricting admin role assignments until an official patch is applied.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-14614 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-14614 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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