CVE-2026-15070
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Salon Booking System – Free Version plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 10.30.32. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the setCustomText function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary PHP code into the web-accessible translate-constants.php file within the plugin directory, enabling remote code execution on the server via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. sanitize_text_field() is applied to the POST 'value' parameter but does not neutralize the characters — single quotes, parentheses, semicolons, $, and [] — required to break out of the PHP string literal into which the value is interpolated before being written to disk via file_put_contents().
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Salon Booking System WordPress plugin fails to validate nonces on the setCustomText function, allowing unauthenticated attackers to forge administrative requests via CSRF. Although sanitize_text_field() is applied to the POST 'value' parameter, it does not escape PHP special characters (single quotes, parentheses, semicolons, $, and []), enabling attackers to break out of the string literal and inject arbitrary PHP code. This code is written via file_put_contents() to the web-accessible translate-constants.php file, achieving remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Salon Booking System plugin is installedCheck your WordPress plugins directory or use WP CLI: wp plugin list --name='salon-booking-system' to list the plugin and its current versionAffected if Plugin is installed and version cannot be confirmed as patched
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Check for the translate-constants.php fileLook for the file translate-constants.php in the plugin directory (typically wp-content/plugins/salon-booking-system/) or search your web root for this filename using: find /path/to/webroot -name 'translate-constants.php'Affected if The file exists in a web-accessible directory
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Inspect translate-constants.php for injected codeRead the contents of translate-constants.php and look for suspicious PHP code patterns such as eval(), base64_decode(), shell_exec(), system(), or unusual string assignments containing $, (), ;, or []Affected if The file contains any PHP code that was not intentionally added by administrators
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Test setCustomText function for CSRF vulnerabilityReview the plugin source code for the setCustomText function and verify that a nonce validation check is performed before processing the 'value' POST parameterAffected if The function lacks nonce verification or the nonce check can be bypassed
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Check for unauthorized changes to PHP filesCompare translate-constants.php with any known clean backup, or check file modification timestamps to identify recent unauthorized changesAffected if The file was modified recently or differs from expected content
You are affected if the Salon Booking System plugin is installed, the translate-constants.php file exists with unexpected PHP content, and the setCustomText function lacks proper nonce validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version when released. Until then, enforce CSRF protections via anti-CSRF tokens on all state-changing actions and implement proper PHP escaping (addslashes or similar) before file写入, or restrict file_put_contents access entirely.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation5.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-15070 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-15070 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data