CVE-2026-15584
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA privilege escalation vulnerability was found in the incluster-checks tool for OpenShift. The tool creates privileged debug pods with host filesystem access in the shared default namespace, where any user with the standard edit role can exec into them and obtain root access on cluster nodes.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe incluster-checks tool for OpenShift creates privileged debug pods with host filesystem access in the shared default namespace. Any user with the standard edit role can exec into these pods and obtain root access on cluster nodes, enabling privilege escalation from a standard user to node-level compromise.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if incluster-checks tool is deployedRun 'oc get pods -A | grep incluster-checks' or 'oc get deployments -A | grep incluster-checks' to see if the tool is installed in the clusterAffected if The incluster-checks tool is present in the cluster
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Identify privileged pods with hostPath mounts in default namespaceRun 'oc get pods -n default -o jsonpath={.items[?(@.spec.volumes[*].hostPath)]}' to list pods with hostPath volumes in the default namespace, then inspect their security context with 'oc get pod <name> -n default -o jsonpath={.spec.containers[*].securityContext}'Affected if Pods exist in the default namespace with hostPath volumes and privileged security context (privileged: true, allowPrivilegeEscalation: true)
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Verify RBAC grants edit role in default namespaceRun 'oc get rolebindings -n default -o wide' to see which users and groups are bound to the edit role in the default namespaceAffected if Standard users or groups are bound to the edit role in the default namespace
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Confirm exec access to privileged podsTest whether a standard user with edit role can exec into a privileged hostPath pod using 'oc auth can-i exec -n default --as=<standard-user> --pod=<privileged-pod-name>'Affected if The user with edit role can execute commands into privileged pods with hostPath mounts
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Check for pod security admission or OPA policiesReview pod security admission labels on the default namespace ('oc get namespace default -o jsonpath={.metadata.labels}') and check for OPA Gatekeeper policies that might restrict privileged pods with 'oc get constrainttemplates' or 'oc get constraints'Affected if No pod security enforcement or OPA policies exist to block privileged hostPath pods in the default namespace
A user is affected if the incluster-checks tool is deployed and creates privileged pods with hostPath mounts in the default namespace that are accessible to standard users with edit role.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable or remove the incluster-checks tool if possible, and implement pod security admission or OPA policies to prevent creation of privileged pods with hostPath mounts in the default namespace.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-15584 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-15584 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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