CVE-2026-15779
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA flaw was found in samba's pam_winbind. When mkhomedir is enabled, pam_winbind chowns the target account's home directory without validating the path is not a critical system directory such as /. On affected systems, accounts with / as their home directory (a common default for system accounts) can have this triggered not only by root, but by a non-root user holding a narrow sudo delegation to run commands as that account, causing ownership of / to change and resulting in severe denial of service (SSH, sudo, and package-manager failures). The change does not grant write access to / (which ships with restrictive 0555 permissions on RHEL), so the impact is availability loss rather than further privilege escalation.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencepam_winbind's mkhomedir functionality does not validate whether the target home directory path is a critical system directory before performing a chown operation. When accounts (such as system accounts) have '/' set as their home directory, a non-root user with sudo delegation to run commands as that account can trigger pam_winbind to change ownership of the root filesystem, causing catastrophic availability loss.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify pam_winbind package is installedCheck for pam_winbind in the package manager (e.g., dpkg -l | grep pam_winbind, rpm -qa | grep winbind, or ls /lib/security/pam_winbind.so)Affected if pam_winbind package is present on the system
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Identify if mkhomedir is enabled in PAM configurationSearch PAM configuration files for 'pam_winbind.so mkhomedir' entry (e.g., grep -r 'pam_winbind.*mkhomedir' /etc/pam.d/)Affected if pam_winbind with mkhomedir directive is configured in any PAM service file
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Check for accounts with '/' as home directoryQuery accounts with home directory set to '/' using 'getent passwd' or 'awk -F: '$6=="/" {print}' /etc/passwd'Affected if Any account (especially system accounts like daemon, bin, sys) has '/' listed as the home directory field
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Review sudo permissions for non-root usersCheck for sudo rules allowing execution as accounts with '/' home directory (e.g., sudo -l -U target_user or examine /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d/)Affected if Non-root users have sudo privileges to run commands as accounts with '/' as home directory
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Confirm conjunction of conditionsCross-reference: if pam_winbind mkhomedir is active AND accounts with '/' home exist AND non-root users can sudo to those accounts, the system is vulnerableAffected if All three conditions (pam_winbind mkhomedir enabled, '/' home directory accounts present, sudo access to those accounts by non-root users) are true simultaneously
The environment is affected only if pam_winbind mkhomedir is enabled, system accounts with '/' as home directory exist, AND non-root users have sudo delegation to execute commands as those accounts, allowing chown of the root filesystem.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnsure system accounts do not have '/' as their home directory; consider disabling mkhomedir for system accounts or applying any available samba updates that add path validation in pam_winbind.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-15779 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-15779 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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