This vulnerability in SGLang's multimodal endpoint is an SSRF with local file read via the image_url parameter—the parameter accepts arbitrary URI schemes including file://, creating a path that merges 'fetch this URL' with 'read this file' without any security boundary. The CVSS 6.5 score materially understates the risk. This endpoint sits in the serving layer between model weights, internal APIs, artifact storage, and orchestration pipelines—compromising it means compromising the chokepoint where trust boundaries converge. A file read that would be medium-severity in a monolith web app can expose credentials to everything else in the serving infrastructure, including cloud metadata endpoints.
If you're running SGLang, verify whether the image_url parameter is exposed in your deployment configuration. Restrict network egress at the infrastructure level to block file:// and internal service URIs (169.254.169.254 metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes service IPs) regardless of application-level fixes. The underlying vulnerability exists because Python's HTTP stack (urllib, httpx, aiohttp) has always supported arbitrary URI schemes—it's legacy behavior from an era when 'local HTTP server' was the threat model, not multimodal serving infrastructure processing untrusted URIs.
The longer-term concern: this same pattern likely exists in other LLM serving projects built on the same Python HTTP stack. Treat this disclosure as a signal to audit similar endpoints across your AI infrastructure, not just patch this one instance.