CVE-2026-1812
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in bolo-blog bolo-solo up to 2.6.4. This impacts the function importFromCnblogs of the file src/main/java/org/b3log/solo/bolo/prop/BackupService.java of the component Filename Handler. The manipulation of the argument File leads to path traversal. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA path traversal vulnerability exists in the importFromCnblogs function of BackupService.java in bolo-solo up to v2.6.4. The filename handler fails to properly validate/sanitize the File argument, allowing remote attackers to manipulate file paths and access files outside the intended directory via directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.6.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify bolo-solo installation and versionLocate the deployed bolo-solo application and check its version. Common locations include: war/jar file names, version files (VERSION or version.txt), or the application's main page/footer which often displays the version number. Compare your installed version to the affected range: <= 2.6.4.Affected if The installed version is 2.6.4 or lower.
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Locate BackupService.java in the deploymentSearch for BackupService.java in the application's source code or decompiled classes. In deployed applications, look for class files named BackupService.class, typically under paths like WEB-INF/classes/ or in the jar/war archive.Affected if The vulnerable BackupService class exists in the deployment.
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Verify the importFromCnblogs function is presentExamine the BackupService class to confirm the importFromCnblogs method exists. This method handles file imports from Cnblogs and contains the vulnerable filename handling logic.Affected if The importFromCnblogs method is present in BackupService.java.
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Check if backup/import functionality is exposedIdentify if the importFromCnblogs function is exposed via a web endpoint or API. Check web.xml or application configuration files for servlet mappings related to backup or import features. Common endpoint patterns may include /api/backup/import or similar paths.Affected if The backup import functionality is accessible via HTTP/HTTPS endpoints.
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Test for directory traversal vulnerabilityIf the import functionality is accessible, attempt a controlled test using directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../) in the filename parameter to see if the application allows access outside the intended directory. Use a test environment and observe whether path validation is enforced.Affected if The application allows path traversal sequences to bypass directory restrictions in the import function.
A user is affected if running bolo-solo version 2.6.4 or lower with the BackupService importFromCnblogs function exposed and lacking proper path validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict input validation on the File argument using path normalization (realPath) and explicit directory containment checks, or use basename() to strip directory components and reject any path containing traversal sequences.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing5.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-1812 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-1812 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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