CVE-2026-20219
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability in the REST API of Cisco Slido could have allowed an authenticated, remote attacker to access the social profile data of other users or affect quiz and poll results. Cisco has addressed this vulnerability in Cisco Slido and no customer action is needed. This vulnerability existed because of the presence of an insecure direct object reference. Prior to this vulnerability being addressed, an attacker could have exploited this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the vulnerable API endpoint. A successful exploit could have allowed the attacker to view the social profiles of other users or affect quiz and poll results.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Cisco Slido REST API allows authenticated attackers to access other users' social profile data or manipulate quiz/poll results by sending crafted requests to the vulnerable API endpoint. The attacker needs valid authentication but can access or modify data belonging to other users.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco Slido deploymentInventory your environment for Cisco Slido installations - check for web applications, internal tools, or integrated Slido components. Search for 'Slido' in your application listings, documentation, or deployed services.Affected if Cisco Slido is deployed in the environment
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Determine Cisco Slido versionLocate the version information for your Cisco Slido deployment. This may be visible in the application UI footer, administrative panel, or by querying /api/version or /health endpoints if available. Compare against any known patched versions.Affected if The installed version predates the vendor patch or cannot be determined
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Verify REST API accessibilityConfirm that the Cisco Slido REST API endpoints are exposed and accessible to authenticated users. Check if API documentation or endpoints (typically under /api/ or /rest/ paths) are reachable.Affected if REST API endpoints are accessible to authenticated users
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Check for authorization controls on API endpointsIf you have a test environment with multiple user accounts, send authenticated API requests to endpoints that access social profile data or quiz/poll results using another user's object identifiers. Verify whether the API returns data or allows modification without proper authorization checks.Affected if API allows access to or modification of other users' data without proper ownership validation
If Cisco Slido is running and its REST API is accessible to authenticated users, the environment may be affected unless the vendor patch has been applied.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataNo customer action required as Cisco has already addressed this vulnerability through a vendor patch. Organizations should verify their Cisco Slido deployment is running the patched version.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-20219 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-20219 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data