CVE-2026-22039
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedKyverno is a policy engine designed for cloud native platform engineering teams. Versions prior to 1.16.3 and 1.15.3 have a critical authorization boundary bypass in namespaced Kyverno Policy apiCall. The resolved `urlPath` is executed using the Kyverno admission controller ServiceAccount, with no enforcement that the request is limited to the policy’s namespace. As a result, any authenticated user with permission to create a namespaced Policy can cause Kyverno to perform Kubernetes API requests using Kyverno’s admission controller identity, targeting any API path allowed by that ServiceAccount’s RBAC. This breaks namespace isolation by enabling cross-namespace reads (for example, ConfigMaps and, where permitted, Secrets) and allows cluster-scoped or cross-namespace writes (for example, creating ClusterPolicies) by controlling the urlPath through context variable substitution. Versions 1.16.3 and 1.15.3 contain a patch for the vulnerability.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceKyverno versions prior to 1.16.3 and 1.15.3 contain an authorization boundary bypass where namespaced Policy apiCall operations execute using the Kyverno admission controller's ServiceAccount identity without enforcing namespace restrictions. Authenticated users with Policy creation permissions can manipulate urlPath via context variable substitution to target any API path permitted by Kyverno's RBAC, enabling cross-namespace reads (ConfigMaps, Secrets) and cluster-scoped writes (ClusterPolicies).
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.15.3>= 1.16.0, < 1.16.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Kyverno versionRun 'kubectl get deployment -n kyverno kyverno -o jsonpath="{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}"' or check the Helm chart versionAffected if The installed version is less than 1.15.3, or between 1.16.0 and 1.16.3 (excluding 1.16.3)
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Check for namespaced Policy create RBAC bindingsReview RBAC bindings in each namespace: 'kubectl get rolebindings --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.subjects[]? | contains({kind: "User" or "Group"})) | select(.roleRef.kind == "Role") | {namespace: .metadata.namespace, role: .roleRef.name}'Affected if Users or groups have Role bindings granting Policy (kyverno.io) create permissions in any namespace
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Identify Policies using apiCall with context substitutionSearch Policy manifests for 'context:' and 'apiCall:' patterns: 'kubectl get policies --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.spec.context[]?.apiCall != null) | {name: .metadata.name, namespace: .metadata.namespace}'Affected if Any namespaced Policy contains context variables referencing apiCall operations
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Inspect Kyverno ServiceAccount RBAC scopeGet Kyverno admission controller ServiceAccount: 'kubectl get serviceaccount kyverno-admission-controller -n kyverno -o yaml' then check its ClusterRole bindings: 'kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.subjects[]? | contains({name: "kyverno-admission-controller", namespace: "kyverno"}))'Affected if The Kyverno admission controller ServiceAccount has ClusterRole bindings with elevated permissions (beyond basic Kyverno operations)
You are affected if Kyverno version is below 1.15.3 or between 1.16.0-1.16.3 AND users have namespaced Policy create permissions with policies using apiCall context variables.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.15.31.16.3
Upgrade to Kyverno 1.16.3 or 1.15.3 to apply the patch. Additionally, audit and restrict permissions for users with the ability to create or modify namespaced Kyverno Policies to minimize the attack surface until patching is complete.
Kyverno 1.15.3 (if on 1.15.x line) or 1.16.3 (if on 1.16.x line)
- Identify current Kyverno version running in the cluster using `kubectl get deploy -n kyverno` or `helm list -n kyverno`
- If running Kyverno 1.15.x versions prior to 1.15.3, plan upgrade to version 1.15.3
- If running Kyverno 1.16.x versions >= 1.16.0 and prior to 1.16.3, plan upgrade to version 1.16.3
- For Helm-based installations, upgrade using: `helm upgrade kyverno kyverno/kyverno -n kyverno --version <new-version>`
- For non-Helm installations, apply the new manifest from the Kyverno releases page
- Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the Kyverno admission controller deployment version
- Optionally restrict the Kyverno admission controller ServiceAccount RBAC as a defense-in-depth measure until upgrade is complete
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-22039 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-22039 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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