CVE-2026-22718
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe VSCode extension for Spring CLI are vulnerable to command injection, resulting in command execution on the users machine.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe VSCode extension for Spring CLI contains a command injection vulnerability that allows execution of arbitrary operating system commands on the user's machine. This occurs when user-supplied input is passed to system shell commands without proper sanitization, enabling an attacker to escape intended command boundaries.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Spring CLI VSCode extension is installedOpen VS Code and go to Extensions view (Ctrl+Shift+X), search for 'Spring Boot Extension Pack' or 'Spring CLI'. Alternatively, check the extensions folder at ~/.vscode/extensions/ for directories containing 'spring' in the name.Affected if The extension is found in the VSCode extensions directory or listed in the Extensions view
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Identify the installed version of the Spring CLI extensionIn VS Code Extensions view, click on the Spring extension to view its details. The version number is displayed under the extension name. Alternatively, open the extension's package.json file in ~/.vscode/extensions/<extension-folder>/package.json and check the 'version' field.Affected if The installed version is older than the patched version (if known) or cannot be determined to be current
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Verify if the extension has been activated in any workspaceCheck VS Code's extension host log at ~/.vscode/logs/<timestamp>/exthost.log or the main log for entries mentioning 'spring' or the extension name. Also check recent workspace folders that contain Spring projects (.java files with Spring annotations, pom.xml, or build.gradle).Affected if The extension has been loaded or activated in any workspace, especially with Spring projects
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Check for recent shell command execution via the extensionReview system command history or audit logs around the time the Spring extension was active. On Linux/macOS, check ~/.bash_history or similar shell history files for unexpected commands that may have been injected.Affected if Shell commands appear in history that were not intentionally executed by the user, or contain suspicious payloads typical of command injection
The user is affected if the Spring CLI VSCode extension is installed and has been used with any project, as the vulnerability allows arbitrary command execution when the extension processes user-supplied input.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to the latest version of the VSCode Spring CLI extension when available; until then, avoid using the extension with untrusted projects and limit the extension's network access where possible.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-22718 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-22718 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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