CVE-2026-25550
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSeagull Software BarTender 2010, 2016, and 2019 contain an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the .NET Remoting service exposed on TCP port 7375 via BtSystem.Service.exe. The service registers an unauthenticated singleton endpoint — BarTenderSystem for BarTender 2016 <= R9, and DataServiceSingleton for BarTender 2019 <= R10 — configured with BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider and TypeFilterLevel set to Full. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit .NET Remoting object unmarshalling to read or write arbitrary files on the server using the .NET WebClient class, or coerce NTLMv2 authentication by supplying a UNC path to an attacker-controlled server, enabling sensitive credential disclosure, remote code execution, or lateral movement depending on service account privileges and network environment. The service runs in the context of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBarTender's .NET Remoting service on TCP port 7375 exposes an unauthenticated deserialization endpoint (BarTenderSystem for 2016, DataServiceSingleton for 2019) with BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider and TypeFilterLevel=Full. This allows unauthenticated attackers to unmarshal malicious .NET objects, enabling arbitrary file read/write via WebClient or NTLMv2 credential capture via UNC path injection. The service runs as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify BarTender installation existsCheck for BarTender installation directory (commonly in C:\Program Files\Seagull\BarTender or C:\Program Files (x86)\Seagull\BarTender) and look for BtSystem.Service.exe in the installation folderAffected if BarTender is installed and BtSystem.Service.exe is present on the system
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Confirm BtSystem.Service.exe is runningOpen Task Manager or run 'tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq BtSystem.Service.exe"' in command prompt to check if the process is activeAffected if The BtSystem.Service.exe process is currently running as a service
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Detect if port 7375 is listeningRun 'netstat -an | findstr :7375' or use PowerShell 'Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 7375' to check if the .NET Remoting service is bound to the networkAffected if Port 7375 shows as LISTENING or ESTABLISHED, indicating the service is exposed on the network
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Identify installed BarTender versionCheck the BarTender version via the executable properties (right-click BtSystem.Service.exe -> Properties -> Details), or look in Windows Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Seagull\BarTender\ or the application's About dialogAffected if The installed version matches or falls within the affected version range for this CVE (compare against vendor-supplied vulnerable version list)
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Verify service runs with elevated privilegesRun 'tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq BtSystem.Service.exe" /V' to view the user context, or check the service properties in Services.msc to see the logged-on accountAffected if The service runs as SYSTEM or another high-privilege account, making remote exploitation particularly severe
A user is affected if BarTender is installed with BtSystem.Service.exe running and listening on port 7375, and the installed version is within the vulnerable range.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedRestrict or block external access to TCP port 7375 via firewall, disable the .NET Remoting service if unnecessary, or upgrade to patched versions if available. If the service must remain exposed, implement authentication and reconfigure TypeFilterLevel to Low.
Contact Seagull Scientific ([email protected]) for availability of security-updated versions beyond BarTender 2019 R10 or BarTender 2016 R9
- 1. Identify all servers running BarTender 2010, 2016, or 2019 with the BtSystem.Service.exe component listening on TCP port 7375
- 2. If the .NET Remoting service on port 7375 is not required for business operations, uninstall the BarTender affected components or remove BtSystem.Service.exe from the system
- 3. If the service is required, block inbound TCP port 7375 at the network perimeter firewall to prevent unauthenticated external access
- 4. If internal-only access is required, implement IP whitelist filtering on the firewall or use host-based firewall rules to restrict access to only trusted IP addresses
- 5. Audit the service account privileges and, if possible, configure BtSystem.Service.exe to run under a least-privilege account instead of NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- 6. Monitor network logs for any unauthorized connection attempts to port 7375
- 7. Contact Seagull Scientific technical support to inquire about available security patches or upcoming fixed versions for this vulnerability
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-25550 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-25550 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data