Deserialization of Untrusted DataWeakness · CWE-502

CVE-2026-25551

HIGH · 7.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-06-04
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
80/100
Remediation priority · High
Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Seagull Software BarTender 2021 R1 through 12.0.1 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability that allows low-privileged local users to escalate privileges. The DataServiceSingleton .NET Remoting endpoint is bound to localhost on TCP port 7375 via BtSystem.Service.exe, limiting the attack surface to local access only. The endpoint is configured with BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider and TypeFilterLevel set to Full. A low-privileged local attacker can send YSoSerial.NET-generated BinaryFormatter payloads to the localhost-bound endpoint to achieve code execution as NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

BarTender's DataServiceSingleton .NET Remoting endpoint on localhost:7375 uses BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider with TypeFilterLevel set to Full, allowing deserialization of arbitrary .NET types. A low-privileged local attacker can send crafted BinaryFormatter payloads via YSoSerial.NET to achieve code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

MitigationUpgrade to a patched version of BarTender or disable the DataServiceSingleton .NET Remoting service if not required; network isolation provides minimal benefit as the vulnerable endpoint is localhost-bound.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify installed BarTender version
    Check the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Seagull\BarTender\Version or examine the version property of the BarTender installation directory (typically C:\Program Files\Seagull\BarTender).
    Affected if The installed version falls within the range 2021 R1 through 12.0.1 (verify against vendor release notes for exact version numbers).
  2. Verify BtSystem.Service.exe is running
    Open Task Manager or run 'tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq BtSystem.Service.exe"' in Command Prompt to check if the service process is active.
    Affected if BtSystem.Service.exe is currently running on the system.
  3. Confirm port 7375 is listening
    Run 'netstat -ano | findstr :7375' or use PowerShell 'Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 7375' to check if TCP port 7375 is bound and listening.
    Affected if Port 7375 is in LISTENING state bound to 127.0.0.1 (localhost).
  4. Check BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider configuration
    Examine the BtSystem.Service.exe configuration files in the BarTender installation directory for BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider with TypeFilterLevel set to Full.
    Affected if The configuration contains BinaryServerFormatterSinkProvider with TypeFilterLevel="Full" (the vulnerable setting).

A system is affected if it runs a vulnerable BarTender version (2021 R1 through 12.0.1) with BtSystem.Service.exe active and port 7375 listening with the Full TypeFilterLevel configuration.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version of BarTender or disable the DataServiceSingleton .NET Remoting service if not required; network isolation provides minimal benefit as the vulnerable endpoint is localhost-bound.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation4.0 h
  • Implementation8.0 h
  • Testing3.0 h
  • Review / QA2.0 h
17.0 hours of engineering $3,050
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Scan for this in your stack

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-25551 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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