CVE-2026-26267
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedsoroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Prior to versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1, the `#[contractimpl]` macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls. `#[contractimpl]` generates code that uses `MyContract::value()` style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function. This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously: First, an `impl Trait for MyContract` block is defined with one or more functions, with `#[contractimpl]` applied. Second, an `impl MyContract` block is defined with one or more identically named functions, without `#[contractimpl]` applied. If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function. The problem is patched in `soroban-sdk-macros` versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from `<Type>::func()` to `<Type as Trait>::func()` when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists. Users should upgrade to `soroban-sdk-macros` 22.0.10, 23.5.2, or 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts. If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisA detailed technical summary for this CVE is being prepared.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 22.0.10>= 23.0.0, < 23.5.2>= 25.0.0, < 25.1.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped22.0.1023.5.225.1.1
soroban-sdk-macros version 22.0.10 (for 22.x), 23.5.2 (for 23.x), or 25.1.1 (for 25.x)
- Identify which version branch your project uses (22.x, 23.x, or 25.x) by checking your Cargo.toml for the soroban-sdk-macros or rs-soroban-sdk dependency version
- Upgrade soroban-sdk-macros to the fixed version: 22.0.10 for 22.x branch, 23.5.2 for 23.x branch, or 25.1.1 for 25.x branch
- Update your Cargo.lock file by running cargo update
- Recompile all contracts that depend on the affected SDK versions to ensure the patched macro is used
- If upgrading is not immediately possible, audit all impl blocks in your contract code: ensure no inherent `impl ContractName` block contains functions with identical names to functions in any `impl Trait for ContractName` block with #[contractimpl]
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-26267 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-26267 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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