CVE-2026-2711
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA vulnerability has been found in zhutoutoutousan worldquant-miner up to 1.0.9. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file worldquant-miner-master/agent-dify-api/core/helper/ssrf_proxy.py of the component URL Handler. The manipulation of the argument make_request leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The attack's complexity is rated as high. The exploitability is regarded as difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the URL Handler function of ssrf_proxy.py. The make_request argument can be manipulated to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-controlled URLs, potentially accessing internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or internal network resources.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Locate ssrf_proxy.py in your environmentSearch for the file ssrf_proxy.py in your codebase or installed packages using: find / -name 'ssrf_proxy.py' 2>/dev/null or pip show ssrf_proxy (if installed as a package)Affected if The file exists and is in use in your environment
-
Identify if URL Handler function is exposedReview the ssrf_proxy.py code and check if the URL Handler function is exposed via an API endpoint, web route, or other network-accessible interface. Look for decorators like @app.route, @api_view, or function mappings in web frameworksAffected if The URL Handler function is exposed as a network-accessible endpoint without proper authentication
-
Inspect make_request parameter handlingExamine the URL Handler function code to see how the make_request argument is processed. Look for code that passes this parameter to HTTP request functions (requests.get, urllib, httpx, etc.) without validationAffected if The make_request parameter is taken from user input and passed directly to HTTP request functions without sanitization
-
Check for URL input validationSearch the codebase for URL validation logic (allowlists, regex patterns, URL parsers) applied to the make_request parameter before making HTTP requestsAffected if No URL validation or allowlist validation exists, allowing arbitrary URLs to be passed
-
Verify internal IP and metadata endpoint blockingLook for code that blocks requests to internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x) and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254 for AWS/Azure/GCP)Affected if No blocking of internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints is implemented
Your environment is affected if ssrf_proxy.py is deployed and its URL Handler function is exposed as a network-accessible endpoint where the make_request parameter can be controlled without validation or internal IP filtering.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict URL allowlist validation using a whitelist of permitted domains/IPs and protocols. Disable or restrict access to internal IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Add authentication and authorization checks to the affected API endpoint.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-2711 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-2711 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data