CVE-2026-27113
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedLiquid Prompt is an adaptive prompt for Bash and Zsh. Starting in commit cf3441250bb5d8b45f6f8b389fcdf427a99ac28a and prior to commit a4f6b8d8c90b3eaa33d13dfd1093062ab9c4b30c on the master branch, arbitrary command injection can lead to code execution when a user enters a directory in a Git repository containing a crafted branch name. Exploitation requires the LP_ENABLE_GITSTATUSD config option to be enabled (enabled by default), gitstatusd to be installed and started before Liquid Prompt is loaded (not the default), and shell prompt substitution to be active (enabled by default in Bash via "shopt -s promptvars", not enabled by default in Zsh). A branch name containing shell syntax such as "$(...)" or backtick expressions in the default branch or a checked-out branch will be evaluated by the shell when the prompt is rendered. No stable release is affected; only the master branch contains the vulnerable commit. Commit a4f6b8d8c90b3eaa33d13dfd1093062ab9c4b30c contains a fix. As a workaround, set the LP_ENABLE_GITSTATUSD config option to 0.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisUser input reaches a shell or system command without being fully separated from the command itself, so an attacker can append their own instructions. Because these run with the application's privileges, it often means full control of the host. The lasting fix is to avoid the shell entirely — call APIs directly and pass arguments as data, never as concatenated strings.
General guidance for the os command injection class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedmaster branch at commit a4f6b8d8c90b3eaa33d13dfd1093062ab9c4b30c or later
- 1. Identify your current liquidprompt installation: check which branch and commit is currently in use
- 2. If using the master branch, update to the latest master branch which includes the fix at commit a4f6b8d8c90b3eaa33d13dfd1093062ab9c4b30c
- 3. Alternatively, manually apply the fix by cherry-picking or merging commit a4f6b8d8c90b3eaa33d13dfd1093062ab9c4b30c
- 4. After upgrading, verify the fix is applied by checking git log for the commit
- 5. As a secondary mitigation (workaround), edit your liquidprompt configuration file and set LP_ENABLE_GITSTATUSD=0 to disable the vulnerable feature
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-27113 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27113 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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