CVE-2026-27446
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMissing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability in Apache Artemis, Apache ActiveMQ Artemis. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use the Core protocol to force a target broker to establish an outbound Core federation connection to an attacker-controlled rogue broker. This could potentially result in message injection into any queue and/or message exfiltration from any queue via the rogue broker. This impacts environments that allow both: - incoming Core protocol connections from untrusted sources to the broker - outgoing Core protocol connections from the broker to untrusted targets This issue affects: - Apache Artemis from 2.50.0 through 2.51.0 - Apache ActiveMQ Artemis from 2.11.0 through 2.44.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Artemis version 2.52.0, which fixes the issue. The issue can be mitigated by one of the following: - Remove Core protocol support from any acceptor receiving connections from untrusted sources. Incoming Core protocol connections are supported by default via the "artemis" acceptor listening on port 61616. See the "protocols" URL parameter configured for the acceptor. An acceptor URL without this parameter supports all protocols by default, including Core. - Use two-way SSL (i.e. certificate-based authentication) in order to force every client to present the proper SSL certificate when establishing a connection before any message protocol handshake is attempted. This will prevent unauthenticated exploitation of this vulnerability. - Implement and deploy a Core interceptor to deny all Core downstream federation connect packets. Such packets have a type of (int) -16 or (byte) 0xfffffff0. Documentation for interceptors is available at https://artemis.apache.org/components/artemis/documentation/latest/intercepting-operations.html .
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA critical authentication bypass in Apache Artemis/ActiveMQ Artemis allows unauthenticated attackers to force the broker to initiate outbound Core federation connections to attacker-controlled servers. This enables full queue access for message injection and exfiltration across any queue on the broker.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data>= 2.11.0, <= 2.44.0= 2.50.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Apache Artemis versionCheck the broker version by inspecting the lib/artemis-server-version.jar or running: java -jar lib/artemis-server-version.jar. Alternatively, check the pom.xml in the Artemis installation directory.Affected if Version is >= 2.11.0 and <= 2.44.0, or exactly 2.50.0
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Verify Core federation is configuredExamine the broker.xml configuration file (typically at etc/broker.xml) and look for <federation> elements or any federation-related configuration under the core protocol settings.Affected if Federation configuration exists and uses Core protocol for upstream or downstream connections
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Check acceptors accepting Core protocol connectionsReview all <acceptor> elements in broker.xml. Look for any acceptor with 'core' in the transport configuration (e.g., tcp://0.0.0.0:61616?protocols=CORE,AMQP) that may accept connections from untrusted networks.Affected if An acceptor configured with Core protocol is bound to an IP address accessible from untrusted networks (0.0.0.0 or public-facing IP)
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Inspect network exposure of brokerCheck firewall rules and network configuration to determine if the Core protocol acceptor ports are exposed to the internet or untrusted internal networks.Affected if Core protocol ports (typically 61616 or configured acceptor ports) are reachable from untrusted network segments
You are affected if running a vulnerable Artemis version (2.11.0-2.44.0 or 2.50.0) with Core federation or acceptors accessible from untrusted networks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedRestrict Core protocol access on untrusted acceptors or enable mutual SSL authentication to prevent unauthenticated federation connection hijacking; alternatively, upgrade to Artemis 2.52.0 or implement a Core interceptor to block federation connect packets.
Apache Artemis 2.52.0 or later
- Upgrade Apache Artemis to version 2.52.0 or later, which contains the fix for this vulnerability
- If immediate upgrade is not possible, edit the broker.xml configuration file
- Locate the acceptor definitions (default 'artemis' acceptor on port 61616)
- Add the 'protocols' parameter to restrict allowed protocols, excluding 'CORE'. For example: `<acceptor name="artemis">tcp://0.0.0.0:61616?protocols=CORE,AMQP,OPENWIRE;...` should be changed to exclude CORE from untrusted acceptors
- Alternatively, implement two-way SSL by configuring keyStorePath, keyStorePassword, trustStorePath, and trustStorePassword on the acceptor
- Alternatively, deploy a custom Core interceptor that rejects packets with type (int) -16 or (byte) 0xfffffff0 to block federation connect attempts
- Restart the broker after making configuration changes
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27446 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
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