CVE-2026-27727
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedmchange-commons-java, a library that provides Java utilities, includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted `jaxax.naming.Reference` or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code. Implementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to `false`, `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened. Mirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java's JNDI functionality is gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values starting in version 0.4.0. No known workarounds are available. Versions prior to 0.4.0 should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencemchange-commons-java contains an independent JNDI implementation that supports remote factoryClassLocation resolution, allowing malicious Reference or serialized objects to trigger arbitrary code download and execution. This bypasses JDK hardening because the library implements its own dereferencing logic rather than using JDK code. Versions 0.4.0+ gate this functionality behind restrictive configuration defaults.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 0.4.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate mchange-commons-java in your applicationSearch your application dependencies (Maven pom.xml, Gradle build files, lib/ folders, WAR files) for mchange-commons-java. Also check nested JARs using 'jar tf' or unzip -l commands.Affected if mchange-commons-java is present in your classpath or dependencies
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Identify the installed versionExamine the JAR filename for version (e.g., mchange-commons-java-0.3.x.jar) or inspect the manifest file inside the JAR. In Maven, run 'mvn dependency:tree | grep mchange-commons-java' to see the resolved version.Affected if The version is lower than 0.4.0 or no version is specified (indicating an old inclusion)
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Check for JNDI usage in your application codeSearch source code for imports or usage of javax.naming.Reference, javax.naming.StringRefAddr, or any code that creates JNDI references. Also check configuration files for JNDI resource definitions.Affected if Your application creates or processes javax.naming.Reference objects or deserializes objects from JNDI lookups
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Inspect application serialization pathsReview code that deserializes objects from external sources, especially if those sources could be controlled via JNDI lookup results. Look for ObjectInputStream usage with data from JNDI contexts.Affected if Your application deserializes data retrieved from JNDI lookups without validation
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Verify JDK JNDI security settingsCheck if your JVM is running with -Dcom.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase=false (this mitigates JDK JNDI but does NOT protect against mchange-commons-java's own JNDI implementation).Affected if Your application relies solely on JDK JNDI protections without accounting for mchange-commons-java's independent JNDI handling
Your environment is affected if mchange-commons-java version below 0.4.0 is present in the classpath AND your application uses JNDI features that could trigger the library's custom dereferencing logic.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped0.4.0
Upgrade mchange-commons-java to version 0.4.0 or later, which applies restrictive defaults to JNDI functionality. Test thoroughly to ensure the new defaults do not break legitimate JNDI operations.
0.4.0 or later
- Identify all dependencies that include mchange-commons-java version < 0.4.0
- Upgrade mchange-commons-java to version 0.4.0 or later in all affected applications
- Rebuild and redeploy applications with the updated dependency
- Verify that the upgraded library is correctly loaded at runtime
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,352.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-27727 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- github.com
- mogwailabs.de
- github.com
- mogwailabs.de
- www.mchange.com
- www.mchange.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- access.redhat.com
- bugzilla.redhat.com
- security.access.redhat.com
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27727 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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