CVE-2026-27787
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCross-site scripting vulnerability exists in MATCHA SNS 1.3.9 and earlier. If this vulnerability is exploited, an arbitrary script may be executed on the web browser of the user who accessed the website using the product.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceCross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MATCHA SNS 1.3.9 and earlier allows attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript or HTML into web pages, which then executes in the browsers of users who visit affected pages. This occurs due to insufficient input validation and output encoding of user-supplied data rendered in web pages.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.3.9CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm MATCHA SNS installationLocate the application files or check the web server for the presence of MATCHA SNS. Look for version information in the application footer, admin panel, or version file within the installation directory.Affected if MATCHA SNS version 1.3.9 or earlier is confirmed to be installed
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Determine exact version numberAccess the admin interface or check the source files for the version identifier. Compare the installed version against the affected range (<=1.3.9).Affected if Version is 1.3.9 or any earlier version number
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Verify user-generated content functionalityCheck if the application has features that accept user input such as posts, comments, user profiles, messages, or any content submission forms.Affected if The application accepts and stores user-submitted content that gets rendered to other users
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Confirm content is rendered without sanitizationSubmit a test payload containing HTML or script tags through the identified input fields (such as a post or profile field). Then view that content as a different user to observe if the injected code executes.Affected if User-supplied content is displayed to other users without proper output encoding/escaping
If MATCHA SNS version 1.3.9 or earlier is running and the application allows users to submit and view content, the environment is likely affected by this stored XSS vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor-provided patch for MATCHA SNS to address input sanitization. Implement output encoding and input validation on all user-controlled data before rendering in HTML context. Consider deploying a WAF as interim protection until patch is applied.
Version 1.4.0 or later (first version after 1.3.9)
- 1. Identify the current installed version of Matcha SNS by checking the application configuration or administration panel
- 2. Navigate to the official Matcha SNS distribution or repository (oss.icz.co.jp or similar official source)
- 3. Download the latest stable release version newer than 1.3.9
- 4. Back up the current Matcha SNS installation including database and configuration files
- 5. Deploy the new version, ensuring all configuration files are properly migrated
- 6. Verify the application functions correctly after upgrade
- 7. Test that the XSS vulnerability is no longer exploitable by reviewing the fixed code paths or using automated XSS scanning tools
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-27787 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-27787 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data