CVE-2026-30305
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSyntx's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution syntax (specifically $(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSyntx's command auto-approval module uses fragile regex-based parsing to whitelist git commands, but fails to sanitize shell command substitution syntax ($(...) and backticks). Attackers can inject malicious commands via arguments like --grep="$(malicious_command)", causing the system to approve the command as safe while the shell executes the injected payload, resulting in unauthenticated RCE.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.5.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Orangecat Syntx installation and versionLocate the Syntx installation directory and check the version file or binary version (typically via 'syntx --version' or checking version metadata in the installation folder). Compare the installed version to the affected range: <= 2.5.0.Affected if The installed version is 2.5.0 or lower.
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Confirm the command auto-approval module is activeExamine the Syntx configuration files for settings related to 'auto-approval', 'command-whitelist', 'git-approval', or similar features that control whether git commands are automatically permitted without user confirmation.Affected if The auto-approval module is enabled in the configuration.
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Verify git command whitelisting uses regex-based parsingInspect the configuration or code that defines which git commands are considered safe. Look for regex patterns or string matching logic that validates commands against a whitelist.Affected if The system uses regex-based parsing to whitelist git commands.
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Test for shell metacharacter injection in git argumentsConstruct a test git command with an argument containing shell command substitution syntax (such as --grep='$(whoami)' or --grep='`id`') and observe whether the auto-approval module accepts and executes it without rejecting the injection syntax.Affected if The auto-approval module accepts git commands with arguments containing $() or backtick syntax without sanitizing them.
If Orangecat Syntx version 2.5.0 or lower has the auto-approval module enabled with regex-based git command whitelisting that does not reject shell metacharacters in arguments, the environment is vulnerable to unauthenticated RCE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace fragile regex-based command parsing with a robust parser that explicitly rejects or properly escapes shell metacharacters (including $(), backticks, pipes, semicolons, and other injection vectors) before whitelist validation.
- Consultation8.0 h
- Implementation24.0 h
- Testing12.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-30305 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-30305 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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