Missing AuthorizationWeakness · CWE-862

CVE-2026-3045

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-03-13
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
The Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of sensitive data in all versions up to and including 1.6.9.29. This is due to two compounding weaknesses: (1) a non-user-bound `public_nonce` is exposed to unauthenticated users through the public `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` REST endpoint, and (2) the `get_item()` method in `SSA_Settings_Api` relies on `nonce_permissions_check()` for authorization (which accepts the public nonce) but does not call `remove_unauthorized_settings_for_current_user()` to filter restricted fields. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to access admin-only plugin settings including the administrator email, phone number, internal access tokens, notification configurations, and developer settings via the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` endpoint. The exposure of appointment tokens also allows an attacker to modify or cancel appointments.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

The Simply Schedule Appointments WordPress plugin exposes a public nonce through the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` endpoint that can be reused to authenticate to the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` endpoint. The `get_item()` method accepts this public nonce for authorization but fails to filter restricted settings fields, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve admin-only configuration including email, phone, access tokens, and notification settings. Exposed appointment tokens further enable modification or cancellation of existing appointments.

MitigationUpdate the plugin to version 1.6.9.30 or later which implements proper user-bound nonce validation and calls `remove_unauthorized_settings_for_current_user()`. Rotate any exposed access tokens and review appointment data for unauthorized modifications.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm plugin installation and version
    Check the WordPress plugin directory for simply-schedule-appointments folder and read the main plugin file header for the Version: field, or query the /wp-json/ssa/v1/version endpoint if exposed
    Affected if The installed version is lower than 1.6.9.30
  2. Verify embed-inner endpoint is publicly accessible
    Send a GET request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner without authentication headers and confirm it returns a 200 response with nonce data
    Affected if The endpoint returns success and includes a nonce value without requiring logged-in status
  3. Test settings endpoint authorization bypass
    Use the nonce obtained from embed-inner endpoint to make an authenticated request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/general or /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/notifications without a user-bound session
    Affected if The request returns admin-restricted settings (email addresses, phone numbers, access tokens, notification preferences) without requiring actual admin authentication
  4. Check for exposed appointment tokens
    Review API responses from /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments or related endpoints for appointment_token fields that could be used to modify or cancel appointments
    Affected if Appointment tokens are returned in responses to unauthenticated or public nonce-authenticated requests

The environment is affected if the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin version is below 1.6.9.30 and the /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section} endpoint returns restricted admin configuration when queried with a public embed nonce.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

dbcve · scoped
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update the plugin to version 1.6.9.30 or later which implements proper user-bound nonce validation and calls `remove_unauthorized_settings_for_current_user()`. Rotate any exposed access tokens and review appointment data for unauthorized modifications.

Recommended fix Moderate confidence

Latest version of Simply Schedule Appointments (version higher than 1.6.9.29)

  1. Check the current version of the 'Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments' plugin installed on your WordPress site
  2. Navigate to Plugins > Installed Plugins in the WordPress admin dashboard
  3. If the current version is 1.6.9.29 or lower, update the plugin to the latest available version
  4. After updating, verify the REST API endpoints `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` and `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` are no longer accessible to unauthenticated users
  5. Confirm that admin-only settings (administrator email, phone number, access tokens, notification configurations) are no longer exposed via the API

Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.

Have this fixed Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation2.0 h
  • Testing1.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
6.0 hours of engineering $1,090
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3045 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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