CVE-2026-3045
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of sensitive data in all versions up to and including 1.6.9.29. This is due to two compounding weaknesses: (1) a non-user-bound `public_nonce` is exposed to unauthenticated users through the public `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` REST endpoint, and (2) the `get_item()` method in `SSA_Settings_Api` relies on `nonce_permissions_check()` for authorization (which accepts the public nonce) but does not call `remove_unauthorized_settings_for_current_user()` to filter restricted fields. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to access admin-only plugin settings including the administrator email, phone number, internal access tokens, notification configurations, and developer settings via the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` endpoint. The exposure of appointment tokens also allows an attacker to modify or cancel appointments.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Simply Schedule Appointments WordPress plugin exposes a public nonce through the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` endpoint that can be reused to authenticate to the `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` endpoint. The `get_item()` method accepts this public nonce for authorization but fails to filter restricted settings fields, allowing unauthenticated attackers to retrieve admin-only configuration including email, phone, access tokens, and notification settings. Exposed appointment tokens further enable modification or cancellation of existing appointments.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm plugin installation and versionCheck the WordPress plugin directory for simply-schedule-appointments folder and read the main plugin file header for the Version: field, or query the /wp-json/ssa/v1/version endpoint if exposedAffected if The installed version is lower than 1.6.9.30
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Verify embed-inner endpoint is publicly accessibleSend a GET request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner without authentication headers and confirm it returns a 200 response with nonce dataAffected if The endpoint returns success and includes a nonce value without requiring logged-in status
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Test settings endpoint authorization bypassUse the nonce obtained from embed-inner endpoint to make an authenticated request to /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/general or /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/notifications without a user-bound sessionAffected if The request returns admin-restricted settings (email addresses, phone numbers, access tokens, notification preferences) without requiring actual admin authentication
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Check for exposed appointment tokensReview API responses from /wp-json/ssa/v1/appointments or related endpoints for appointment_token fields that could be used to modify or cancel appointmentsAffected if Appointment tokens are returned in responses to unauthenticated or public nonce-authenticated requests
The environment is affected if the Simply Schedule Appointments plugin version is below 1.6.9.30 and the /wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section} endpoint returns restricted admin configuration when queried with a public embed nonce.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpdate the plugin to version 1.6.9.30 or later which implements proper user-bound nonce validation and calls `remove_unauthorized_settings_for_current_user()`. Rotate any exposed access tokens and review appointment data for unauthorized modifications.
Latest version of Simply Schedule Appointments (version higher than 1.6.9.29)
- Check the current version of the 'Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments' plugin installed on your WordPress site
- Navigate to Plugins > Installed Plugins in the WordPress admin dashboard
- If the current version is 1.6.9.29 or lower, update the plugin to the latest available version
- After updating, verify the REST API endpoints `/wp-json/ssa/v1/embed-inner` and `/wp-json/ssa/v1/settings/{section}` are no longer accessible to unauthenticated users
- Confirm that admin-only settings (administrator email, phone number, access tokens, notification configurations) are no longer exposed via the API
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3045 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3045 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data