A3300r FirmwareOperating system · Totolink

CVE-2026-31181

CRITICAL · 9.8 CVSS v3.1 Published 2026-04-23
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
100/100
Remediation priority · Urgent
Public exploit Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
An issue was discovered in ToToLink A3300R firmware v17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the stunServerAddr parameter to /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · moderate confidence

OS command injection vulnerability in ToToLink A3300R router firmware v17.0.0cu.557_B20221024. Attackers can execute arbitrary operating system commands by injecting shell metacharacters into the stunServerAddr parameter when calling the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint, likely due to unsanitized user input being passed to a system() or similar function.

MitigationUpdate to a patched firmware version if available. If no update exists, disable remote administration, restrict management interface access to trusted networks only, and consider replacing the end-of-life device.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
A3300r FirmwareOperating system
Affected:= 17.0.0cu.557_b20221024

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify the device model
    Check the router label or access the web interface to confirm the device is a ToToLink A3300R model
    Affected if The device is not a ToToLink A3300R router
  2. Check the firmware version
    Access the router web administration panel, typically at the default IP (e.g., 192.168.0.1 or 192.168.1.1), and navigate to System Status or Firmware Upgrade to view the installed firmware version. Alternatively, check the build date in the firmware filename if you have firmware backup access.
    Affected if The firmware version is 17.0.0cu.557_b20221024
  3. Verify the CGI endpoint is accessible
    Attempt to access http://<router_ip>/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi from within the local network. A response (even an error) indicates the CGI interface is active.
    Affected if The CGI endpoint responds, indicating it is enabled and reachable
  4. Confirm the stunServerAddr parameter is processed
    Send a crafted request to the CGI endpoint with the stunServerAddr parameter (e.g., via curl: curl -X POST http://<router_ip>/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi -d 'topicurl=stun&stunServerAddr=test'). Observe if the parameter is processed and reflected in the response.
    Affected if The parameter is accepted and processed by the CGI binary without sanitization validation

A user is affected if they are running ToToLink A3300R firmware version 17.0.0cu.557_b20221024 with the web CGI interface accessible and the stunServerAddr parameter functional.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Update to a patched firmware version if available. If no update exists, disable remote administration, restrict management interface access to trusted networks only, and consider replacing the end-of-life device.

Fix this in A3300r Firmware Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation3.0 h
  • Implementation6.0 h
  • Testing5.0 h
  • Review / QA3.0 h
17.0 hours of engineering $2,970
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-31181 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
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  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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