CVE-2026-31845
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Rukovoditel CRM version 3.6.4 and earlier in the Zadarma telephony API endpoint (/api/tel/zadarma.php). The application directly reflects user-supplied input from the 'zd_echo' GET parameter into the HTTP response without proper sanitization, output encoding, or content-type restrictions.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceA reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Rukovoditel CRM version 3.6.4 and earlier allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious JavaScript via the 'zd_echo' GET parameter in the Zadarma telephony API endpoint (/api/tel/zadarma.php). The application directly echoes user-supplied input without sanitization, encoding, or content-type restrictions, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Rukovoditel CRM versionLocate the version file or admin panel version display in your installation. Common locations include a version.php file, README file, or the About section in the administration dashboard.Affected if The installed version is 3.6.4 or any earlier version of Rukovoditel CRM.
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Locate the vulnerable endpoint fileCheck for the presence of the file /api/tel/zadarma.php in your web server document root or application directory.Affected if The file /api/tel/zadarma.php exists in your installation.
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Verify Zadarma telephony module is accessibleDetermine whether the Zadarma telephony integration module is enabled or configured in your Rukovoditel instance. Check module settings in the admin panel or configuration files.Affected if The Zadarma telephony module is enabled or the endpoint is accessible without authentication.
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Test for reflected XSS via zd_echo parameterSend a crafted GET request to /api/tel/zadarma.php with a test payload in the zd_echo parameter (for example: ?zd_echo=<script>alert(1)</script>) and examine the response to see if the input is reflected without encoding.Affected if The zd_echo parameter value is reflected verbatim in the response without HTML encoding or sanitization.
Your environment is affected if you are running Rukovoditel CRM version 3.6.4 or earlier, the /api/tel/zadarma.php endpoint exists, and the Zadarma telephony module is enabled or accessible, with the zd_echo parameter reflecting unsanitized input.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade to Rukovoditel CRM version 3.7 or later, which implements proper input validation and output encoding. Alternatively, apply input sanitization and output encoding to the zd_echo parameter in the vulnerable endpoint.
3.7
- 1. Confirm current Rukovoditel CRM version by checking the application interface or configuration files
- 2. Create a complete backup of the database and all application files
- 3. Download Rukovoditel CRM version 3.7 from the official vendor website or repository
- 4. Extract the version 3.7 package and replace the existing application files
- 5. Run any available database migration scripts included in the 3.7 release
- 6. Verify the fix by accessing the /api/tel/zadarma.php endpoint with a test parameter to confirm proper output encoding is applied
- 7. Test that legitimate Zadarma telephony functionality continues to work correctly after the upgrade
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-31845 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-31845 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data