CVE-2026-3256
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHTTP::Session versions before 0.54 for Perl defaults to using insecurely generated session ids. HTTP::Session defaults to using HTTP::Session::ID::SHA1 to generate session ids using a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the high resolution epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. The distribution includes HTTP::session::ID::MD5 which contains a similar flaw, but uses the MD5 hash instead.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe HTTP::Session Perl module versions before 0.54 uses a cryptographically weak session ID generator (HTTP::Session::ID::SHA1) that combines the insecure built-in rand() function with guessable values (PID from a small namespace and epoch time potentially leaked from HTTP headers). An attacker can predict or brute-force valid session IDs, enabling session hijacking attacks. An alternative ID generator using MD5 has the same flaw.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 0.53CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if HTTP::Session Perl module is installedRun 'perl -MHTTP::Session -e "print $HTTP::Session::VERSION"' or check via 'cpan -D HTTP::Session' or 'cpanm --info HTTP::Session'Affected if The module is not installed or the command fails, indicating HTTP::Session is not in use
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Determine installed version of HTTP::SessionExecute 'perl -MHTTP::Session -e "print $HTTP::Session::VERSION"' to obtain the version number, or inspect the version in your project's dependency file (cpanfile, Makefile.PL, or similar)Affected if Version is 0.53 or lower, meaning the vulnerable version is present
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Verify application uses HTTP::Session for session managementSearch source code for 'use HTTP::Session' or 'HTTP::Session->new' statements in your application Perl filesAffected if The application imports and uses HTTP::Session to manage sessions, enabling the flaw
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Inspect session ID generation methodIf accessible, examine the session ID creation code in the application or HTTP::Session source to confirm it relies on default SHA-1/MD5 hashing with weak rand() seedingAffected if Session IDs are generated using the default weak algorithm rather than cryptographically secure randomness
You are affected if HTTP::Session version 0.53 or earlier is installed and your application uses it for session management.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade HTTP::Session to version 0.54 or later, which uses cryptographically secure random generation for session IDs. If unable to upgrade immediately, audit applications for session ID exposure in headers like HTTP Date.
HTTP::Session 0.54
- Update HTTP::Session to version 0.54 or later using your Perl module manager (e.g., cpanm HTTP::Session or cpan HTTP::Session)
- Verify the installed version is 0.54 or higher by running 'perl -MHTTP::Session -e "print $HTTP::Session::VERSION"'
- If using a build system or dependency manager, update your cpanfile or similar to require HTTP::Session >= 0.54
- Regenerate any existing session IDs if applicable, as pre-0.54 IDs may have been generated with weak randomness
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,464.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-3256 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-3256 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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