CVE-2026-33420
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedVaultwarden is a Bitwarden-compatible server written in Rust. In version 1.35.4 and earlier, the get_org_collections_details endpoint (GET /api/organizations/{org_id}/collections/details) is missing the has_full_access() authorization check that exists on the sibling get_org_collections endpoint. This allows any Manager-role user with accessAll=False and no collection assignments to retrieve the names, UUIDs, user-to-collection mappings, and group-to-collection mappings for all collections in the organization. This issue has been fixed in version 1.35.5.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceVaultwarden versions 1.35.4 and earlier lack an authorization check (has_full_access()) on the GET /api/organizations/{org_id}/collections/details endpoint. This allows Manager users with accessAll=False and no collection assignments to bypass intended access controls and retrieve sensitive organization data including collection names, UUIDs, and user/group-to-collection mappings.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 1.35.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Vaultwarden versionCheck the running Vaultwarden version via the admin interface, docker image tag, or package manager. If using the web vault, the version is often displayed in the footer of the admin page.Affected if Version is 1.35.4 or earlier
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Verify organization existsConfirm you have organizations configured in Vaultwarden by logging into the web vault and checking for the 'Organizations' section, or by querying the API at /api/organizationsAffected if At least one organization is present
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Identify Manager role usersQuery the API endpoint GET /api/organizations/{org_id}/users (replace {org_id} with your organization UUID) and examine the 'type' or 'role' field for users with Manager roleAffected if Any user has Manager role in the organization
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Check Manager user accessAll flagExamine the JSON response from /api/organizations/{org_id}/users for Manager users. Look for the 'accessAll' field - if it is set to false and the user has Manager role, they meet the vulnerable conditionAffected if Manager users exist with accessAll=false and no collection assignments
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Test the vulnerable endpointUsing a test Manager account (accessAll=false, no collections assigned), make a GET request to /api/organizations/{org_id}/collections/details. If the response returns collection names, UUIDs, and user mappings, the vulnerability is presentAffected if Endpoint returns collection data without requiring full admin access
You are affected if Vaultwarden version is 1.35.4 or earlier AND your organization has Manager role users with accessAll=false who can retrieve all collection details through the vulnerable endpoint.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped1.35.5
Upgrade Vaultwarden to version 1.35.5 or later to apply the missing authorization check.
1.35.5
- Ensure you have a backup of your Vaultwarden data and configuration before upgrading
- Stop the Vaultwarden service
- Upgrade Vaultwarden to version 1.35.5 or later
- Verify the service starts successfully
- Confirm the upgrade was successful by checking the Vaultwarden version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-33420 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-33420 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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