CVE-2026-33746
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedConvoy is a KVM server management panel for hosting businesses. From version 3.9.0-beta to before version 4.5.1, the JWTService::decode() method did not verify the cryptographic signature of JWT tokens. While the method configured a symmetric HMAC-SHA256 signer via lcobucci/jwt, it only validated time-based claims (exp, nbf, iat) using the StrictValidAt constraint. The SignedWith constraint was not included in the validation step. This means an attacker could forge or tamper with JWT token payloads — such as modifying the user_uuid claim — and the token would be accepted as valid, as long as the time-based claims were satisfied. This directly impacts the SSO authentication flow (LoginController::authorizeToken), allowing an attacker to authenticate as any user by crafting a token with an arbitrary user_uuid. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.1.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe JWTService::decode() method in Convoy validates time-based claims (exp, nbf, iat) but omits the SignedWith cryptographic signature constraint, allowing attackers to forge JWT tokens by modifying claims like user_uuid and authenticate as any user via the SSO flow.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.5.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Convoypanel Convoy versionLocate the installed Convoypanel version number in the system configuration, about page, or package managerAffected if The installed version is below 4.5.1
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Determine if JWT authentication is activeInspect the Convoypanel configuration files or admin panel to see if JWT-based authentication is enabled for user loginsAffected if JWT authentication is enabled and the deployed version is below 4.5.1
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Locate JWTService implementationSearch the Convoypanel codebase for the JWTService class and its decode() methodAffected if The JWTService::decode() method exists and processes tokens without enforcing SignedWith validation
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Inspect LoginController authorizeToken flowExamine the LoginController::authorizeToken method to verify it relies on JWT tokens for user authenticationAffected if The authorizeToken flow uses JWT tokens from JWTService::decode() and version is below 4.5.1
A Convoypanel Convoy installation below version 4.5.1 with JWT-based SSO authentication enabled is vulnerable to forged token authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.5.1
Upgrade Convoy to version 4.5.1 or later which includes the patched JWTService::decode() method with proper signature verification.
4.5.1
- 1. Backup the Convoy application database and configuration files before proceeding with the upgrade
- 2. Check the currently installed Convoy version (e.g., via command line or admin panel)
- 3. Upgrade Convoy to version 4.5.1 using your package manager or installation method (e.g., composer update, docker pull, or apt/yum upgrade depending on your setup)
- 4. After upgrade, clear any cached JWT tokens or sessions
- 5. Verify the upgrade was successful by checking the version number
- 6. Test the authentication flow to confirm JWT signature validation is now working properly
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-33746 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-33746 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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