CVE-2026-34114
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedGuardian language-system passes the id GET parameter directly into a PHP exec() call in translate_text.php (line 18) without sanitization: exec(\"php jobs/translate_text.php \".$login_session.\" \".$_GET['id'].\" ...\"). No authentication is required. An unauthenticated remote attacker can append shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Guardian language-system's translate_text.php passes the 'id' GET parameter directly into a PHP exec() call without any sanitization or escaping, allowing an attacker to inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary OS commands. No authentication is required, making this trivially exploitable by any remote attacker.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate translate_text.php fileSearch the web root and application directories for the file translate_text.php (e.g., find / -name translate_text.php or use your file system search)Affected if The file exists in the environment and is part of the Guardian language-system application
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Check Guardian language-system versionInspect the application's version file, composer.json, or any version metadata to determine the installed version of Guardian language-systemAffected if The installed version matches or precedes the affected version range for this vulnerability (compare against vendor's advisory)
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Verify 'id' parameter handling in codeOpen translate_text.php and examine how the 'id' GET parameter is used - search for exec(), shell_exec(), system(), or similar functions that receive $_GET['id'] directlyAffected if The 'id' parameter is passed directly to exec() or similar function without sanitization, validation, or escaping
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Confirm unauthenticated access is possibleAttempt to access translate_text.php directly over HTTP/HTTPS without providing any authentication credentialsAffected if The script is reachable without authentication and accepts the 'id' parameter via GET request
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Check for input validation or filteringReview translate_text.php for any input validation functions, sanitization routines, or parameterized command execution methods before the exec() callAffected if No validation, sanitization, or escaping is applied to the 'id' parameter before it reaches exec()
A user is affected if translate_text.php exists, is accessible without authentication, and the 'id' parameter is passed directly to exec() without any sanitization or validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately sanitize or whitelist-validate all user input before passing to exec(), and consider replacing the exec() call with a safer alternative such as a dedicated translation API or proper input parameterization.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2026-34114 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2026-34114 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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